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I.

INTRODUCTION

Local governments can be sued under 42 U.S.C.

§ 19831 for some but not

all constitutional violations that their employees commit. In Monell v.
Department of Social Services of New York, 2 the Supreme Court rejected the

common law respondeat superior doctrine, which imposes vicarious liability
for torts committed by an organization's employees in the course of the
employment.3 "Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or
custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983."4 Monell left open two important issues: (a) whether
governments would have immunity from liability for damages, 5 by analogy to
the qualified immunity defense available to individual defendants unless they
violate "clearly established" rights, 6 and (b) how "policy or custom" would be
1.
The statute provides, in part, that "[e]very person who, under color of [state law]
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . person . . to the deprivation of [constitutional rights]
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
2.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 694 (1978) (explaining that local
governments are "persons" subject to suit under § 1983). State governments are not "persons"
within the meaning of the statute and thus may not be sued under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-67 (1989); cf John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for
Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REv. 207, 236 (2013) (criticizing this distinction and arguing
that "states and cities should be treated the same").
3.
See, e.g., Gaston v. Ghosh, 920 F.3d 493, 494-95, 497 (7th Cir. 2019). But see Ira S.
Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1968). For discussion of
the fairness and economic rationales for vicarious liability, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden
and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1749-64
(1996).
4. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see, e.g., Calgaro v. St. Louis County, 919 F.3d 1054, 1059
(8th Cir. 2019) ("[O]ne erroneous determination by a county employee . . does not establish a
policy or custom of the County that deprives [plaintiffs] of their constitutional rights.").
5.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 701.
6.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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defined.7 Two years later, it addressed the first of these questions: Owen v.
City of Independence flatly denied governments any immunity, even when

their officers' actions complied with clearly established law."Monell, coupled
with Owen, thus imposes a kind of strict liability, for both damages and
prospective relief,9 when a local government's policy or custom is the
"moving force" of a constitutional violation.10
Later cases on the policy or custom issue have not produced a similarly
crisp rule. The Court has distinguished between two types of cases, depending
on whether the government involvement is "direct" or "indirect."" In the

"direct-effect" cases, a law-making body promulgates a general
unconstitutional rule or a single "policymaker" makes an unconstitutional
decision.1 2 This type of case is illustrated by Monell, which involved a
challenge to New York City's requirement that pregnant employees must take
leave at five months of the pregnancy.1 3 In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, the

Court recognized liability in the "single decision" fact pattern." In that case,
the local district attorney had directed police officers to enter a doctor's office
by force, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights." In both Monell and

Pembaur, government responsibility is direct in the sense that no actor
intervenes between the policymaker and the violation.1 6 Under Owen's "no
immunity" rule, the plaintiff wins this type of case when he proves a violation
of his constitutional rights and a causal connection between that violation and
the plaintiff's harm.' 7 For example, the City was liable in Pembaur even

7.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.
8.
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 622 (1980).
9.
See Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 30 (2010).
10. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
11. See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1997) (distinguishing the
two types of cases). The "direct" and "indirect" vocabulary is borrowed from Mann v. County
ofSan Diego, 907 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2018).
12. A policymaker is "some official or body that has the responsibility for making law or
setting policy in any given area of a local government's business." City of St. Louis v.
Prapromtnik, 485 U.S. 112, 125 (1988) (plurality opinion). The determination of whether a given
official is a policymaker on a particulartopic requires "[r]eviewing the relevant legal materials,
including state and local positive law, as well as custom or usage having the force of law." Jett
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). In practice, "the location of 'policymaking' authority" has been a "conceptually
difficult problem" for lower courts. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 435 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In this
Article, however, I stipulate the continuing viability of the Court's "policymaker" approach to
municipal liability.
13. Monell, 436 U.S. at 661 n.2.
14. Pembaurv. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986).
15. Id. at 469.
16. See id. at 481; Monell, 436 U.S. at 661.
17. See generally Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
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though the Supreme Court did not decide the illegality of the search until years
later.' 8 Though some analysts object to Owen's denial of immunity,1 9 none of
the Justices have questioned this regime.
This Article focuses on indirect-effect cases, in which policymakers do
not violate constitutional rights. Rather, a street-level officer, or some other
subordinate, makes the key decision that involves a constitutional violation.
When plaintiffs sue such officers directly, the officers benefit routinely from
the qualified immunity defense. 20 Plaintiffs thus search for ways to secure
damages from the government itself in indirect-effect cases. 21 Sometimes they
succeed. In particular, governments are subject to liability in these indirect
cases if, but only if, policymakers have acted or failed to act with "deliberate
indifference" to constitutional rights.22 When is this liability-triggering
standard met? Courts have declared that "a municipal policymaker cannot
exhibit . . deliberate indifference to a constitutional right when that right has
not yet been clearly established." 23 As a practical matter, the deliberate
indifference requirement thus limits governmental liability in much the same
way that qualified immunity limits officer liability. 24 The law governing these
cases is especially important because, in practice, the indirect cases are far
more numerous than the direct ones. 25 There are far more underlings than

18. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 475 (discussing the holding of Steagaldv. UnitedStates,
451 U.S. 204 (1981)).
19. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewellto ConstitutionalTorts, 107 CALIF.
L. REV. 933, 978-79 (2019); Edward C. Dawson, Replacing Monell Liability with Qualified
Immunity for Municipal Defendants in 42 U S.C. § 1983 Litigation, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 483
(2018).
20. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This defense is available to
policymakers as well as subordinates. Those officials who exercise legislative, judicial, or
prosecutorial functions are absolutely immune from liability from damages, no matter how
clearly established the law may be. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS:
ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 49-89 (Saul Levmore et al. eds., 4th ed. 2018) [hereinafter
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS].
21. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 57 n.a.

22. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
23. Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir. 2017)
(emphasis omitted) (citing Hagans v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff's Office, 695 F.3d 505, 511 (6th Cir.
2012)); see also Bustillos v. El Paso Cty. Hosp. Dist., 892 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2018)
("Because Bustillos did not demonstrate a clearly established right, it follows that her claims for
deliberate indifference against the District also fail.").
24. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84
VA. L. REV. 47, 58 (1998) ("[F]ault has been explicitly reintroduced by requiring proof of
'deliberate indifference' to constitutional rights.").
25. It should also be noted that the distinction between direct and indirect cases is not
always a sharp one. See, e.g., Morgan v. Fairfield County, 903 F.3d 553, 566 (6th Cir. 2018)
(distinguishing between municipal policy and an employee's "interpretationof a policy").
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policymakers and, if only for that reason, far more constitutional violations by
underlings.
Courts distinguish among several indirect-effect fact patterns. The
litigation may involve delegation of authority to subordinates, 26 ratification of
decisions by underlings, 27 inaction in the face of a widespread custom of
street-level employees, 28 or faulty training, hiring, or supervision of
employees. 29 The key feature of all of these cases is that, as with certain
common law torts, courts distinguish between objective and subjective
liability rules. 30 The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the objective
negligence test, 3 1 ruling that "a showing of simple or even heightened
negligence will not suffice." 32 Showing deliberate indifference requires proof

26. See, e.g., Gschwind v. Heiden, 692 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2012).
27. See, e.g., Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2004).
28. See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) ("[A]n act performed
pursuant to a 'custom' that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker
may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so
widespread as to have the force of law."); see, e.g., Doe v. Vigo County, 905 F.3d 1038, 104445 (7th Cir. 2018); Owens v. Balt. City State's Att'ys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014)
(stressing "condonation"); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001).
29. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see also Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61-62 (2011) (stating that deliberately indifferent inaction "is the
functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution" (citing Harris,
489 U.S. at 395)).
30. See CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS, supra note 20, at 124-27.
31. In so doing, the Court has apparently rejected its dicta in Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 841-42 (1994). Farmer was not a municipal liability case. It involved the Eighth
Amendment rights of prisoners to be protected from assault. The Court held that the Eighth
Amendment standard was whether prison officials had shown deliberate indifference in a
subjective sense to the prisoner's plight. In the course of its opinion, the Court characterized
municipal liability deliberate indifference as an objective standard. Despite the more recent
Supreme Court cases, a few circuit courts continue to follow Farmer and take the view that
deliberate indifference (in the municipal liability context) is an objective test. See, e.g., Garza v.
City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 635-36 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Farmer,511 U.S. at 837) (following
Farmer,the court adopted "objective deliberate difference"); Doe v. Ft. Zumwalt R-II Sch. Dist.,
920 F.3d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841) ("This court applies an
objective standard of deliberate indifference to [plaintiff's] claim .... "); Robinson v. Pezzat,
818 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citingBakerv. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C.
Cir. 2003)); Harvey v. District of Columbia, 798 F.3d 1042, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Jones
v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 601 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
32. Brown, 520 US. at 407. See, e.g., Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff's Office, 743 F.3d
726, 759 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 391); Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d
324, 334 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Amnesty, 361 F.3d at 128); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622
F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2010) (plurality opinion) (citing Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d
261, 279 (3d Cir. 2000)); Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 2010).
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of the policymaker's "conscious disregardfor [constitutional] rights." 33 The

Court's rejection of even heightened negligence indicates that deliberate
indifference is a subjective test akin to common law recklessness, which
focuses on the attitudes and intentions of policymakers, rather than an
objective test like common law negligence, which would evaluate the
policymaker's choices against an external standard. 34
Some critics of the Court's regime would remove most of the obstacles to
local government liability by reversing Monell's "anti-respondeat superior"
holding.35 Others would eliminate the officer's immunity from damages
liability. 36 These reformers would, in effect, impose a type of liability without
fault-either on governments, officers, or both-in indirect-effect cases. For
these analysts, the key goals involve vindicating constitutional rights and
33. Connick, 563 U.S. at 71; see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 410 (explaining that deliberate
indifference is a stringent standard of fault, which imposes liability only for disregard of "plainly
obvious" risks).
34. Many cases illustrate the subjective test. See, e.g., Doe, 905 F.3d at 1045 (applying
the subjective test for custom); Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2018)
(distinguishing a policymaker's deliberate indifference from negligence); Winkler v. Madison
County, 893 F.3d 877, 902 (6th Cir. 2018) (applying the subjective test for custom); Kelly, 622
F.3d at 264 (plurality opinion) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988))
(stating subjective test for ratification); Amnesty, 361 F.3d at 126 (applying the subjective test
for delegation); Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 1999) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Praprotnik,485 U.S. at 127) (applying the subjective test for ratification). Other courts
require proof of the subjective awareness that is characteristic of deliberate indifference but do
not use the term. See, e.g., Dixon v. County of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016) ("[A]
Monell claim can prevail only if a policy-making official knows about [deficiencies] and fails
to correct them"); Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2015) ("[P]ersistent failure
to take disciplinary action against officers can give rise to the inference that a municipality has
ratified conduct .... " (quoting Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1174 n.12 (11th Cir. 2001),
vacated, 536 U.S. 953 (2002), remanded to 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003))); Dean v. County of
Gage, 800 F.3d 945, 955 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that liability is appropriate when policymaker
"directed, endorsed, and encouraged" subordinates who violated constitutional rights); Jones v.
Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that the plaintiff can recover if
he can show that the "policymaking official was aware of the employee's unconstitutional
actions and consciously chose to ignore them" (citingAmnesty, 361 F.3d at 127)); Love-Lane v.
Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that plaintiff must show that the
policymaker "was aware of the constitutional violation and either participated in, or otherwise
condoned, it").
35. See, e.g., Vodakv. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 747 (7thCir. 2011) (asserting that
Monell's anti-respondeat superior holding was based on "what scholars agree are historical
misreadings"); see also Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Muck, andthe
Madness, 23 WM. & MARY B. RTS. J. 913, 963 (2015); Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 811-13 (1994). For an academic discussion of whether
Monell correctly read the legislative history of § 1983, see CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS, supra note
20, at 49-89.
36. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018).
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deterring constitutional violations, at the expense of the goals-federalism,
government resource conservation, and officer inhibition avoidance-that
drive the current doctrine's constraints on recovery. 37 Most discussions of
§ 1983 municipal liability have treated the issue as a binary choice between
the Court's restrictive doctrine and the critics' strict liability alternative, which
are near-polar extremes. 38
The problem with this winner-take-all battle is that important values will
be sacrificed no matter who wins, and perhaps needlessly so. In devising
constitutional remedies, the goal is to achieve "the best attainable
accommodation of competing values," 39 or as Richard Fallon has put it, "the
best overall bundle of rights and correspondingly calibrated remedies." 40
Neither the Court's existing municipal liability doctrine nor the critics'
proposed alternative is normatively attractive. The Court's approach puts too

many hurdles in the path of plaintiffs seeking recovery for constitutional
violations because deliberate indifference, to say the least, is a stringent
standard. 41 But the critics' strict liability solution goes too far in the other
direction. The costs of strict liability might well outweigh its benefits. 42 In any
event, such a change in the law is not a realistic option for the foreseeable
future. Other, more modest styles of reform thus need to be considered. 43
This Article proposes a new approach to indirect municipal liability cases.
This approach would discard the subjective deliberate indifference standard
and replace it with an objective test similar to the reasonableness rule of

37. Id. at 1826.
38. Blum, supra note 35, at 913, 963.
39. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (discussing the qualified immunity
doctrine).
40. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80
FORDHAM L. REv. 479, 480 (2011).
41. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 415. In Connick and Brown, for
example, the Court overturned jury verdicts in the plaintiff's favor, even though the juries had
been properly instructed on deliberate indifference.
42. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 19, at 976-79 (discussing the costs of constitutional tort
liability and arguing that defenses should be available to allay those costs); John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90-91 (1999) (discussing the
value of a gap between rights and remedies in furthering constitutional innovation).
43. There is a need to consider more modest styles of reform because, so long as
suggestions for law reform are directed to the Supreme Court rather than to Congress, judicial
creativity is typically limited to comparatively small reforms. See Robert Keeton, Creative
Continuity in the Law ofTorts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463, 472-73 (1962) ("It is part of the common
law tradition . .. that in so far as these breaks with precedent are accomplished by judicial
decision rather than by statute they are in the nature of adjustment and adaptation of segments
of doctrine. The more comprehensive breaks with the past are accomplished by statute, and the
courts exercise their power of overruling precedent under an obligation of restraint.").
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common law negligence. Respondeat superior aside, ordinary tort principles

hold employers liable for negligent hiring and supervision.4 4 Under this
approach, local governments would owe a duty of reasonable care to prevent
constitutional violations by their employees. Municipalities would remain
shielded from vicarious liability but would be liable for faulty hiring and
supervision. Liability would not depend on proof of a policymaker's
conscious disregard of obvious risks but on whether policymakers should
have known of constitutional risks, whether they acted reasonably in the
circumstances to diminish those risks, and whether the breach of the duty of
reasonable care was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's constitutional
injury. 45
Part II describes types of cases that comprise the indirect branch of

§ 1983

municipal liability in which a subordinate committed the constitutional
violation. Part III makes the case for replacing the subjective deliberate
indifference standard with an objective reasonable care standard in these
cases. The argument, in a nutshell, is that the overall goal of constitutional tort
law is to balance the costs and benefits of liability by formulating rules that
accommodate values that favor broad liability and those values that largely
close the door to injured plaintiffs who assert these claims. The Court's
current jurisprudence shortchanges this central goal by (unconvincingly)
relying on the claimed need to avoid a "collapse[] into respondeatsuperior."46

While limiting liability to "acts for which the municipality is actually
responsible" 47 is a credible goal, the deliberate indifference requirement is an
overreaction to the problem it addresses. Part IV discusses the implementation
of the reasonable care approach, with particular attention to the application of
negligence principles to local government liability litigation. Part V defends
the fault-based approach against the charge that it would not provide sufficient
protection against the collapse into vicarious liability. Under the traditional
reasonableness-based tort law standard, the Court's goal of avoiding vicarious
liability can be achieved at far less cost to the remedial goals of constitutional
tort law.

44.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS

ON TORTS 631 (11th ed. 2016).
45. In this Article, "fault," "lack of reasonable care," and "negligence" are used as
synonyms.
46. Brown, 520 U.S. at 415; see also Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 ("A less stringent standard
of fault for a failure-to-train claim 'would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on
municipalities....' (quoting City of Cantonv. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989))).
47. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citing
Pembaurv. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)).
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INDIRECT-EFFECT LOCAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY

Monell, Owen, and Pembaur are direct-effect cases, in which the

policymaker commits the constitutional violation, either by formally enacting
an unconstitutional rule, informally engaging in an unconstitutional practice,
or making a single unconstitutional decision. 48 But these cases, especially
Pembaur, lay the foundation for broader liability, in which the subordinate
has committed the constitutional violation and policymakers' involvement is
indirect in the sense that they fail to exercise sufficient oversight to prevent
the violation. 49 Though the government's responsibility is more attenuated in
these indirect-effect cases, policymakers' inattention, passivity, or implicit
complicity in violations still may trigger government liability.
A.

From Pembaur to Praprotnik

The leading case in the development of this indirect-effect doctrine is City
ofSt. Louis v. Praprotnik,50 decided two years after Pembaur. Praprotnik sued

the City under § 1983 after losing his job as an architect. A jury found that
Praprotnik's supervisors had retaliated against him on several occasions for
speech protected by the First Amendment." Though the culpable supervisors
were not policymakers, their superiors up the hierarchical chain had approved
the personnel decisions.5 2 The case thus differed from Monell, Owen, and
Pembaur because Praprotnik did not show that policymakers themselves
made the key decisions that resulted in violations of his constitutional rights.
Even so, Pembaur'sholding that a policymaker's single act can establish
liability will, in some cases, uphold liability when that single act involves
faulty oversight rather than a direct violation. There was no majority opinion,
and in the end, Praprotnik failed to establish municipal liability. 53
Nonetheless, Praprotnik laid the foundation for the indirect-effect doctrine
because all eight participating Justices agreed on the basic principle that
governments could be held liable where the policymaker's involvement is
indirect.5 4 In particular, the separate opinions of Justices O'Connor and
48. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 633 (1980);
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 658 (1978).
49. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 470.
50. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 112.
51. Id. at 117.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 128; see also id. at 142 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
54. Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia. See id. at 114 (plurality opinion). Justice Brennan
concurred in the judgment, in an opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. See id. at
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Brennan were joined by a total of seven members of the Court, and these two
opinions reflected agreement on some basic points with regard to municipal
liability for the acts of subordinates.55
One of those points is that in a anti-respondeat superior regime there are
good reasons for distinguishing between direct-effect and indirect-effect
cases. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion noted the structural difference
between this indirect case and its earlier rulings in Monell and Pembaur.56 As

she observed, "special difficulties arise when it is contended that a municipal
policymaker has delegated his policymaking authority to another official,"s
and the bar against respondeat superior implies that local governments should
not be liable for "the mere exercise of discretion by [a street-level]
employee." 8 Justice O'Connor, however, did not categorically reject
municipal liability in these cases, concluding instead that liability would be
appropriate for some tasks delegated to underlings. 59 As she pointed out,
"[I]f . . a city's lawful policymakers could insulate the government from
liability simply by delegating their policymaking authority to others, § 1983
could not serve its intended purpose." 60 Thus, "if the authorized policymakers
approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it, their ratification would
be chargeable to the municipality because the decision is final." 61 Justice
Brennan's opinion echoes Justice O'Connor on these key points. 62 Justice
Stevens, in the lone dissent, would have upheld the jury verdict in Praprotnik's
favor on the ground-rejected by both Justice O'Connor and Justice

132 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the jury
verdict should have been upheld. See id at 148 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy did
not participate. See id. at 114.
55. See id at 114-32 (plurality opinion); id. at 132-48 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
56. See id. at 121-27 (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 126.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 127.
62. See id. at 132-42 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan's
disagreement with Justice O'Connor centered on the identification of policymakers. Justice
O'Connor asserted that "the identification of policymaking officials is a question of state
law.... [Ilit is not a question of fact in the usual sense." Id. at 124 (plurality opinion); see also
id. at 130. In Justice Brennan's view, "[t]he identification of municipal policymakers is an
essentially factual determination 'in the usual sense,' and is therefore rightly entrusted to a
properly instructed jury." Id at 144 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). The Court later
resolved this dispute by borrowing elements from both opinions. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). Writing for a majority on this issue, Justice O'Connor
characterized the policymaker issue as "a legal question to be resolved by the trial judge," but
one to which "custom or usage" was also relevant.
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Brennan-that

the

plaintiff

had

shown

sufficient

involvement

by

policymakers in the challenged government actions. 63
Praprotnikprovides little guidance to lower courts. Justices O'Connor
and Brennan focus their attention on the specific facts of the case and, in
particular, on the degree of the constitutional wrong. Neither opinion lays out
a general principle for distinguishing between instances of delegation or
ratification that will trigger municipal liability and those that will not. For
example, Justice O'Connor implies that a city should be liable not only when
policymakers ratify decisions by subordinates but also when they
"simply . . . delegate[e] their policymaking authority to others." 64 At the same
time, "Simply going along with discretionary decisions made by one's
subordinates . . . is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy." 65
Additionally, "[M]ere failure to investigate the basis of a subordinate's
discretionary decisions does not amount to a delegation of policymaking
authority." 66 Neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice Brennan examined the
doctrinal implications of these references to delegation and ratification.
B.

Praprotnik Liability in the Lower Courts

In the thirty years since Praprotnik,the Court has not returned to these
issues. Lacking clear Supreme Court guidance, the federal circuit courts have
taken disparate approaches to ratification and delegation. 67 Though courts
often treat these as distinct grounds for exposing governments to § 1983
liability, 68 the line between delegation and ratification is blurry at best. For

example, when policymakers "condone" misconduct by subordinates, the
policymaker's attitude may be described by either term. 69 Part IV will argue
that a reasonable care standard should govern both.

63. See Praprotnik,485 U.S. at 147 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 126 (plurality opinion).
65. Id. at 130.
66. Id.
67. Jack C. Hanssen, Note, Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the
Ratification Theory of City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik: An Analysis of FederalCircuitTreatment,
27 J. LEGIS. 361, 367-77 (2001).
68. See, e.g., Darchak v. City of Chi. Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 630 (7th Cir. 2009)
("Darchak must demonstrate that the Board either delegated final policymaking authority to
Acevedo [a public school principal] or ratified Acevedo's action.").
69. See George M. Weaver, Ratification as an Exception to the § 1983 Causation
Requirement: Plaintiff's Opportunity or Illusion?, 89 NEB. L. REv. 359, 394 (2010); Shari S.
Weinman, Supervisory Liability Under 42 US. C. Section 1983: Searchingfor the Deep Pocket,

56 MO. L. REv. 1041, 1062 (1991).
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Delegation

Some courts have taken a broad view of municipal liability, citing Justice
O'Connor's warning that "[i]f . . a city's lawful policymakers could insulate
the government from liability simply by delegating their policymaking
authority to others,

§ 1983 could not serve its intended purpose."7 0 These

courts hold that policymakers cannot exempt local governments from liability
merely by delegating decision-making authority.7 ' In King v. Kramer, for

example, the county government had hired Health Professionals Ltd. (HPL),
a private company, to manage the health care of inmates in a localjail. 7 2 When
an inmate sued the county, asserting a violation of his right to adequate care,
the county argued that the private company was not a government

policymaker, in part, because of its non-governmental status.7 3 The court,
however, denied summary judgment to the county. It was enough that "[t]he
evidence presented for summary judgment purposes shows that the County's
policy was to entrustfinal decision-making authority to HPL over inmates'

access to physicians and medications." 7 4 Other cases similarly hold that
delegation can turn the subordinate into a policymaker 5 or that the higher
official has delegated authority to the subordinate by condoning violations. 76
Other courts have taken a far more cautious approach to the delegation
theory. An illustrative case is Bolderson v. City of Wentzville. 7

Diane

Bolderson, the city's building commissioner, "criticized changes to the city's
building code," questioned purchasing practices, and accused city officials "of
fraud and acting with conflicts of interest."7 8 The city administrator fired her,
citing these actions on her part. 79 Bolderson sued the city under

§ 1983,

claiming that her dismissal violated her First Amendment rights.80 One of her
grounds for naming the City as a defendant was that the mayor had delegated
70. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126 (plurality opinion).
71. Id.
72. King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1013 (7th Cir. 2012).
73. See id. at 1020.
74. Id. (emphasis added); see also Gschwind v. Heiden, 692 F.3d 844, 848 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that the school district delegated the authority to make employment decisions to
principals).
75. See, e.g., Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1250-52 (10th Cir. 2017); Liverman
v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 413 (4th Cir. 2016); Thompson v. District of Columbia, 832
F.3d 339, 349-50 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Kristofek v. Vill. Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir.
2013); Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982-85 (9th Cir. 2004).
76. See Gschwind, 692 F.3d at 848.
77. Bolderson v. City of Wentzville, 840 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir. 2016).
78. Id. at 984.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 986.
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'

"authority to the city administrator to address Bolderson's criticisms" and had
"tacit[ly] approve[d] . . the city administrator's decision to terminate her."8
The court did not reject this characterization of the facts. Yet it rejected
Bolderson's claim,8 2 relying on Justice O'Connor's observation in Praprotnik
that "[s]imply going along with discretionary decisions made by one's

subordinates . . . is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy." 83
Penley v. McDowell County Board of Education8' seems to take an even

dimmer view of the delegation theory. It suggests that a local government
cannot be liable for a decision by a nonpolicymaker (the school
superintendent) so long as it "did not retain final review authority"85 over the
office's action.
2.

Ratification

If ratification is a distinct category, the feature that sets it apart is that the
policymaker's involvement comes after the subordinate's constitutional
violation. As with delegation, the circuit court cases are not uniform when the
plaintiff claims policymaker post-act approval of a subordinate's
unconstitutional conduct. Some cases are easy, as when the plaintiff asserts
that the policymaker chose, in a focused and deliberate way, to approve the
decision and the unconstitutional reason for it, thereby meeting both prongs
of Justice O'Connor's test.86 Harder issues arise and disagreements surface
when the plaintiff's theory is that the policymaker should have investigated
the subordinate's earlier decision-making. Montero v. City of Yonkers

87

illustrates a plaintiff-friendly view of municipal liability under these
circumstances, as the court recognized a duty on the part of the policymaker
to examine why a subordinate acted as he did. The court concluded that
liability can attach due to ratification even without proof that any policymaker
approved of the unconstitutional reasons for an underling employee's acts, so
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S 112, 130 (1988) (plurality opinion).
84. Penley v. McDowell Cty. Bd. of Educ., 876 F.3d 646, 646 (4th Cir. 2017).
85. Id. at 653 (citing Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004)). But cf
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126 (plurality opinion) ("If . . a city's lawful policymakers could
insulate the government from liability simply by delegating their policymaking authority to
others, § 1983 could not serve its intended purpose.").
86. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 622-23 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding a
complaint that made "[a] plausible claim that [policymakers] knew about the reasons for
[subordinates'] recommendations and . . then ratified them").
87. Montero v. City of Yonkers, 890 F.3d 386, 403 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Amnesty Am.
v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004)). See generally Jones v. Town of E.
Haven, 691 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2012).
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long as the plaintiff can show "that the policymaking official was aware of the
employee's unconstitutional actions and consciously chose to ignore them." 88
Other courts have ruled for the local government in similar circumstances,
finding that no ratification can occur unless there is no review at all; 89 instead,
ratification can arise only when the higher official approves both the decision
and the unconstitutional grounds for it. 90 In Waters v. City of Chicago, 9 ' for

example, the court declared that "mere failure to investigate the basis of a
subordinate's discretionary decisions does not amount to a delegation of
policymaking authority, especially where (as here) the wrongfulness of the
subordinate's decision arises from a retaliatory motive or other unstated
rationales." 92 Though the court uses the term "delegation," 93 the after-the-fact
timing of policymaker involvement suggests that the case more properly falls
into the "ratification" category.
C.

Training, Supervision, and Hiring

Relations between policymakers and underlings are many and varied.
Besides delegation and ratification, which tend to involve relatively high-up
subordinates, policymakers have responsibility for the hiring, training, and
supervising of relatively low-level government workers, including police
officers and jailors who deal with potential constitutional tort victims on a
daily basis. Praprotnik opened the courthouse door to local government
liability for constitutional violations by these street-level officers. A year after
Praprotnik, the Court endorsed that theory of recovery.

88. Montero, 890 F.3d at 403.
89. See, e.g., Lewis v. Union City, 877 F.3d 1000, 1020 (11th Cir. 2017) (denying
municipal liability because "[t]here is no requirement that the administrative review be ideal,
simply that it be a meaningful layer of review of an official's decision"); Soltesz v. Rushmore
Plaza Civic Ctr., 847 F.3d 941, 946-47 (8th Cir. 2017). In Lewis, for example, the plaintiff had
"not offered any facts to suggest that [the policymaker] was a mere rubber stamp or that he
approved any improper motive." 877 F.3d at 1021.
90. See, e.g., Saunders v. Town of Hull, 874 F.3d 324, 331 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Welch
v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 940 (1st Cir. 2008)) (acknowledging that "knowledge and
authorization" are required); Culbertson, 790 F.3d at 622.
91. See Waters v. City of Chicago, 580 F.3d 575, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2009). While the court
uses the term "delegation," Waters was a case in which the plaintiff's dismissal was reviewed
by a policymaker. That officer's approval seems better described as "ratification."
92. Id. at 585 (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S 112 (1988)).
93. Id.
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Training: City of Canton v. Harris

Building on Praprotnik, the Court in City of Canton v. Harris endorsed

the idea that policymakers' inadequate training of street-level officers can
support local government liability. 94 In Praprotnik the Court had avoided
respondeat superior by limiting liability to situations involving delegation or
ratification, although it did not define what those limits were. Harris provided
more guidance. In training cases, municipal liability would extend to
situations in which the plaintiff could prove, first, that the training was
deliberately indifferent to constitutional rights95 and second, that the
inadequate training was "closely related to the ultimate injury." 96
After her arrest by Canton police officers, Harris fell ill while in
custody. 97 Neither the police nor jail officers provided relief or called for
medical assistance. 98 In her § 1983 case, Harris claimed that the officers
violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights because pretrial detainees are
entitled to necessary medical treatment.99 Harris sued the City, but she could
not show that the failures of the jail personnel fit into any of the categories the
Court had recognized in the line of cases from Monell through Praprotnik.1 00
The Fourteenth Amendment violation did not result from a formal or informal

top-down policy or a single act of a policymaker, and it did not involve a
delegation of authority or ratification by a policymaker. Harris proposed, and
the Court recognized, a new theory of municipal liability.101 Her theory was
that "a city can be liable for inadequate training of its employees," 0 2 when
the inadequate training causes a violation of constitutional rights by
subordinates.
The Court adopted this approach,1 03 but with modifications. In particular,
plaintiffs could not succeed in invoking this theory unless "the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the
police come into contact."1 04 Only when this heightened culpability standard
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

City of Cantonv. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989).
Id. at 388.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 381.
Id.
See, e.g., City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983); Harris, 489 U.S.

at 397.
100. Harris, 489 U.S. at 385-86.
101. Id. at 388.
102. Id.
103. In particular, the Court "reject[ed Canton's] contention that only unconstitutional
policies are actionable under the statute." Id. at 387.
104. Id. at 388. Some lower courts describe this as a "knew or should have known" test.
See, e.g., Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Haley v. City of Boston,
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is met "can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city 'policy or

custom' that is actionable under § 1983."105 Also, "the identified deficiency
in a city's training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury."1 06
These requirements were necessary because "lesser standards of fault and
causation would open municipalities to unprecedented liability under
§ 1983."107 According to the Court, "a less stringent standard of fault for a
failure to train claim 'would result in defacto respondeatsuperiorliability on
municipalities. "'108 Deliberate indifference meets this concern because "a
policy of inaction in light of notice that its program will cause constitutional
violations is the functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate
the Constitution."1 09 In this way, the deliberate indifference rule serves the
role of identifying the set of violations by street-level workers for which
governments may fairly be held responsible." 0
Harris sets up a formidable obstacle for the plaintiff. In Connick v.

Thompson," for example, Thompson had been convicted in New Orleans of
crimes in trials at which prosecutors had violated his constitutional right under
Brady v. Marylandto be provided with exculpatory evidence."1

2

His Monell

theory of recovery was that (a) the New Orleans district attorney was the city's
policymaker for prosecutions, (b) the district attorney had failed to train
assistant district attorneys on this constitutional rule, and (c) failure-to-train
was the moving force of the constitutional violation.ii3 The evidence at trial
was that "[n]o prosecutor remembered any specific training session regarding

Brady" during the relevant time period."4 Other evidence included four prior
instances over the past decade in which the New Orleans district attorney's
office had seen convictions overturned on account of violations of this rule," 5
and he obtained a jury verdict in his favor. ii6 The Supreme Court found no
657 F.3d 39, 52 (1st Cir. 2011)). That language suggests negligence and is probably out-of-step
with the Supreme Court's current approach, though it is consistent with the thesis of this Article.
105. Harris, 489 U.S. at 389.
106. Id. at 391.
107. Id.
108. Connickv. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting Harris,489 U.S. at 392).
109. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61-62 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Harris, 489
U.S. at 395 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
110. A corollary of this principle is that no matter how deliberately indifferent the training
may be, plaintiff must also establish a violation of his constitutional rights, see City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per curiam), and a causal link between the deliberate
indifference and the constitutional violation, see Harris,489 U.S. at 378.
111. Connick, 563 U.S. at 51.
112. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 91 (1963).
113. Connick, 563 U.S. at 57.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 62.
116. Id. at 57.
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fault with the jury instructions on deliberate indifference but overturned the
verdict all the same because the earlier Brady violations could be
distinguished on their facts." 7 Despite the jury's verdict, the plaintiff had
failed to show "that failing to train the prosecutors amounted to conscious

disregardfor [his] rights.""18 Thus, the Supreme Court's holding seems to be
that no reasonable jury could find deliberate difference on these facts.119
2.

Hiring: Board of County Commissioners v. Brown

Later cases extended this theory beyond the facts of Harris. Of particular
importance, in Board of County Commissioners v. Brown,120 the Court held

that a hiring decision may produce municipal liability if the plaintiff can show
that "through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force
behind the injury alleged."121 But, having recognized the theory, the Court
applied it narrowly to the facts of the case. A sheriff's deputy, Stacy Burns,
had injured Jill Brown at a traffic stop.1 22 The county sheriff, B.J. Moore, the
policymaker for his department, had hired Burns, the son of the sheriff's
nephew,1 23 as a reserve deputy.1 24 Burns had a history of misdemeanors and
the sheriff admitted that he had "not closely reviewed" Burns' background.1 25
Despite a verdict for the plaintiff, rendered as in Connick by a jury that had

been properly instructed on deliberate indifference, the Court deemed this
single incident insufficient to meet the test.1 26 In relying on Harristo affirm

the verdict, the Court explained that Brown:
[I]gnore[d] the fact that predicting the consequences of a single hiring
decision, even one based on an inadequate assessment of a record, is

117. See id. at 62-63.
118. Id. at 71.
119. See id. at 72 ("The District Court should have granted Connick judgment as a matter
of law on the failure-to-train claim because Thompson did not prove a pattern of similar
violations .... "). Some post-Connick cases hold that proof of a pattern is not always necessary.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)); cf Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d
793, 834 (6th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the evidence as to policy was ambiguous and
conflicting, thus "whether Cleveland had a policy of permitting Brady violations" was a jury
question).
120. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rsv. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
121. Id. at 404.
122. Id. at 401.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 412.
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far more difficult than predicting what might flow from the failure to
train a single law enforcement officer as to a specific skill necessary
to the discharge of duties.1 27
3.

Supervision

Lower courts have upheld Monell recovery in cases involving a failure to
supervise or to discipline employees, rather than a lack of training.128 These
courts in effect have concluded that it makes no sense to limit Harrisonly to
bad training and faulty hiring. Policymaker involvement with subordinates

does not stop once the employees are hired and trained. Lax supervision can
be no less culpable than hiring or training and can be closely connected to
constitutional violations by subordinates. In fact, no circuit seems to have
rejected this ground for recovery. The Court itself has never indicated that it
would distinguish between training and hiring on the one hand and
supervision on the other, so long as the challenged policymaker conduct
involves deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. And given the logic
of the Court's existing precedents, it is hard to see how the Court could draw
such a distinction in the future.
D. Bottom-up Customs

Monell said that municipal liability could be established based on either
a formal policy or a custom.1 29 The term custom, however, is far from
self-defining, and the Court has not provided further guidance. As the case
law has developed in the lower federal courts, there are two distinct lines of
custom-based liability. One is closely related to Monell's direct liability
ground for recovery. In this scenario, the custom is a practice instituted but
never formalized by policymakers. Suppose, for example, that policymakers
routinely obliged pregnant employees to take leave at five months but had
never put the rule on paper. This type of custom has a top-down quality

127. Id. at 410. Plaintiffs rarely win hiring claims. See Young v. City of Providence ex rel.
Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4, 30 (1st Cir. 2005) ("It is much harder . . to succeed on a hiring claim
than a failure to train claim.").
128. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 803 (9th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1234 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011)); Velazquez
v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1027 (9th Cir. 2015); Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d
324, 333-39 (2d Cir. 2011).
129. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
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because it was generated and enforced through the actions of policymakers.
Once proven, it is equivalent to a formal policy.1 30
But lower courts have imposed liability on a quite distinct custom theory.
In this set of cases, the custom originates among mid-level subordinates131 or
even street-level employees such as police officers.1 32 It is bottom-up rather
than top-down, and policymakers may or may not be aware of it. The basic
difference between the two situations is that top-down customs involve a type
of direct-effect Monell liability, while bottom-up customs involve
indirect-effect liability. In the former type of case, the plaintiff is required only
to prove the custom and a causal link between the custom and the
constitutional violation. In a bottom-up custom case, the plaintiff must prove
not only the custom but some level of policymaker acceptance or toleration of
the unconstitutional practice. In Brown, the Supreme Court in dicta seemed to
approve in general terms of liability based on this type of bottom-up
custom.1 33 The Court, however, has never clarified how far this theory of local
government liability reaches.
Lower courts have sought to fill this gap. They typically require plaintiffs
to show two things: (a) a widespread practice among municipal employees,

and (b) some level of awareness of the practice on the part of policymaking

officials.134 For example, in Matusick v. Erie County Water Authority,13 5 a
former county employee prevailed by proof of repeated harassment by
coworkers due to his interracial relationship.1 36 His evidence established that
"the acts of discrimination and harassment [he] alleged . . . were frequent and

130. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hunt County, 921 F.3d 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2019) (observing a
custom that constitutes an "official policy" of "viewpoint discrimination" as evidenced by the
Facebook page of the Hunt County Sheriff's Office).
131. See, e.g., Walkerv. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1256 (11thCir. 2018) (affirming
district court's finding that "the City could directly regulate bail if it wished to and so may be
held responsible for acquiescing in an unconstitutional policy and practice by its Municipal
Court and police").
132. See, e.g., Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 799 (3d Cir. 2019); Doe
v. Vigo County, 905 F.3d 1038, 1045 (7th Cir. 2018).
133. See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (stating that a
government can be liable for "an act performed pursuant to a 'custom' that has not been formally
approved by an appropriate decisionmaker" if "the practice is so widespread as to have the force
of law").
134. See, e.g., Owens v. Balt. City State's Att'ys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 402-03 (4th Cir.
2014) (discussing the elements of a custom theory); Curtis v. Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 595 (5th
Cir. 2013) ("[A] plaintiff must [show] that the body governing a municipality, or an official to
whom the body has delegated its policy-making authority, had actual or constructive knowledge
of the custom of policy at issue." (citing Burge v. St. Tammary Par., 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir.
2003))).
135. 757 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2014).
136. Id. at 36-37, 62-63.
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severe."1 37 Moreover, "many human resources personnel, including the
director of human resources, were aware of his complaints well before he was
terminated.... [But they] failed to act."1 38
On the other hand, in Worldwide Street Preachersv. Town of Columbia,

preachers who claimed the police had unconstitutionally interfered with their
activities lost their suit against the city because they proved only "a few
isolated incidents" of unconstitutional conduct by lower-level officers, and a
few incidents do not suffice to prove a custom.1 39 On the question of
policymaker awareness, no clear rule has emerged. But most courts seem to
require proof that policymakers knew enough about the practice to be charged
with deliberate indifference to the custom

40

or with "actual or constructive

knowledge" of its existence.141
III. AN OBJECTIVE, NEGLIGENCE-BASED APPROACH TO
LIABILITY

§

1983 MUNICIPAL

The foregoing discussion shows that the Monell doctrine distinguishes
among at least nine types of cases, including (a) formal rules of general
application, (b) top-down custom, (c) single unconstitutional acts of a
policymaker, (d) delegation, (e) ratification, (f) bottom-up custom, (g)
inadequate training, (h) inadequate hiring, and (i) inadequate supervision. But

the seeming complexity of this array of doctrines is misleading. The legally
significant distinction in municipal liability cases is between situations in
which a policymaker commits the constitutional violation, which include (a)
through (c), and those in which a subordinate does so, which include (d)
through (i). In the (a) through (c) group of cases, municipal liability is direct,

137. Id. at 63.
138. Id.
139. World Wide St. Preachers v. Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747, 755 (5th Cir. 2009).
Compare Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that repeated practices
of one police officer, with no rebuke by superiors, would amount to "a policy of inaction" by
the county), with D'Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that
"allegations regarding the repeated failures of only one prosecutor" are insufficient to state a
custom case).
140. Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Jackson v.
Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 152 (7th Cir. 1995)). Some opinions suggest, if in an off-handed
way, that policymakers must have knowledge of the unconstitutional practice for the plaintiff's
custom claim to succeed. See, e.g., Regains v. City of Chicago, 918 F.3d 529, 536 (7th Cir.
2019).
141. Curtis v. Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 595 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Burge v. St. Tammary
Par., 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003)).
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while it is indirect for (d) through (i).1 42 The liability for direct policymaker
involvement is strict in the sense that the plaintiff wins by presenting proof of
a constitutional violation and resulting injury without regard to policymaker
fault. But the liability rule for indirect-effect cases is far harder for the plaintiff
to meet. Following the Supreme Court's "inadequate training" decision in
Harris, and its applications of that test in Connick and Brown, most of the
lower court cases across all indirect-effect contexts apply a subjective test.143

The discussion in Part II has shown that courts require plaintiffs to show
deliberate indifference by one or more policymaking officials to recover for
indirect government involvement.
A.

The Monell Court'sAnti-Respondeat SuperiorPrinciple

The Court has justified its disparate treatment of these two sets of cases
by reference to its decision in Monell to reject the respondeat superior theory
of recovery.1 44

The

anti-respondeat

superior

principle

implies

that

governmental liability exists only when governments are responsible for
constitutional violations.1 45 The policymaker's violation establishes the
government's responsibility in direct-effect cases. By contrast, indirect-effect
cases, like the failure-to-train claim in Harris,demand a stringent showing of
policymaker involvement to avoid defacto respondeatsuperior.146 Since this

rationale applies in the same way in all sorts of indirect-effect cases-whether
they involve delegation, ratification, bottom-up custom, or whatever-many
lower courts have adopted the deliberate indifference test in those indirecteffect cases as well. 147
This entire edifice of law, however, is built on an unstable foundation.
The Court's endorsement of the deliberate indifference test skips over a key
question about means and ends in constitutional tort law. To be sure, the
Court's reasoning in these cases begins from a valid premise: Indirect fact
patterns differ in legally significant ways from direct ones. 148 More
specifically, as Justice O'Connor explained in Brown ,149 the difference is that
142. See, e.g., Mannv. County of San Diego, 907 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2018) (drawing
the distinction between direct and indirect municipality liability cases).
143. See, e.g., Connickv. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).
144. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
145. See, e.g., Connick, 563 U.S. at 60; Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403
(1997); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (quoting Monell, 426 U.S. at 694);
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121-22 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
146. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 392).
147. See, e.g., Mann, 907 F.3d at 1164; Doe v. Vigo County, 905 F.3d 1038, 1045 (7th
Cir. 2018); Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2018).
148. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 404-05.
149. Id. at 397.
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governmental responsibility is attenuated in the indirect-effect cases because,
in these cases, policymakers merely fail to stop constitutional violations by
others from occurring. These inattentive or passive policymakers do not
intentionally act in ways that violate constitutional rights.
Concluding that indirect-effect cases differ from direct-effect cases,
however, does not logically support the conclusion that liability in
indirect-effect cases should attach only when plaintiffs can satisfy the
extremely demanding deliberate indifference test. In particular, there exist
alternative approaches available to the Court that would satisfy its stated goal
of avoiding both formal and de facto respondeat superior. The most plausible
is the standard, familiar, and generally applied tort-law negligence test of
objective reasonableness. Indeed, it turns out that the Court in Praprotnik,
Harris,Brown, and Connick has never even asked-far less, carefully worked

through-the most salient and fundamental legal question: Should municipal
liability in these cases be governed by an objective negligence test or a
subjective deliberate indifference test?
Even a moment's reflection suggests that the Court's stated rationale for
adopting the deliberate indifference touchstone for liability has a
question-begging quality. It assumes without analysis that this stringent test

is necessary in order to limit the scope of liability appropriately. The problem
with that assumption is that, in Brown and Connick, the Court treated

anti-vicarious liability as the only relevant consideration.1 50 The Court's
preoccupation with that goal in indirect-effect cases, and its choice of the
deliberate indifference test to squelch the perceived danger, has diverted the
Justices' attention away from the core concerns that lay at the heart of § 1983.
In fact, the Court has developed an expansive body of § 1983 case law built
around the objective of "achieving the best overall bundle of rights and
correspondingly calibrated remedies within our constitutional system."151
More specifically, the key goal of the damages remedy has been to obtain
"the best attainable accommodation of competing values."15 2 This principle
has driven § 1983 doctrine in an across-the-board way, including rulings on
officer immunity, causation, damages computations, and attorney's fees.
Within this framework, the Court has recognized that constitutional tort law
should take into account a range of pro- and anti-liability values.1 53 The main
problem with the Court's municipal liability doctrine is that the deliberate
indifference principle for indirect municipal liability gives too much weight
150. See id.; Connick, 563 U.S. at 51.
151. Fallon, supra note 40, at 480.
152. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see also Ziglarv. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1866 (2017); Andersonv. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (quotingDavisv. Scherer,
468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)).
153. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808.
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to the defendant's side of the balance, on account of the Court's fear of
liability under respondeat superior.
This fixation has diverted the Court's attention from the need to clearly
articulate the normative foundation of § 1983 municipal liability. As in other
contexts, the Court should adopt an approach to indirect-effect cases that
involves a smarter accommodation of competing values. The ensuing sections
of this part suggest how this sort of approach might unfold. Section III.A
describes the key features of the accommodation principle that the Court has
developed and worked within past cases. Section III.B explains why a
balanced application of this accommodation principle supports reappraisal of
the deliberate indifference test. The reason, in brief, is that the accommodation
principle would be better served by holding municipalities to a duty of
reasonable care, under which the city would be liable if, but only if, the
plaintiff could establish a policymaker's negligent failure to protect the
plaintiff from a constitutional violation by a subordinate. With the negligence
model in place, Part IV discusses the practicalities of applying negligence
doctrine in § 1983 municipal liability cases. Part V rebuts the objection,

suggested in Brown and Connick, that a shift away from the deliberate
indifference standard would risk a collapse into strict liability.
B.

Accommodation of Competing Values in ConstitutionalTort Law

Across the range of constitutional tort topics, the law-making task is to
achieve the "proper balance" among policies that support broader or narrower
liability." In its official immunity cases, for example, the Court has
recognized that "[t]he resolution of [official] immunity questions inherently
requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative.""
Courts must weigh the vindication of rights and the dissuading of
constitutional violations against fairness to defendants1 56 and the need to limit
the "social costs" of liability, which include "the expense of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of
able citizens from acceptance of public office."

57

In the official immunity context, the Court has sought to achieve the
needed accommodation by adopting a rule under which officials engaged in
administrative or executive functions may be sued for damages only when

154. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1866.
155. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813.
156. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-40 (2002); Scheuerv. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 24043 (1974).
157. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
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they have violated "clearly established" rights.1 58 This test, as applied in
recent cases, affords considerable protection,1 59 except to "the plainly
incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law."1 60 These
administrative and executive officials have no immunity from prospective
relief, a remedy that does not involve the especially heavy personal and social
costs entailed by awards of damages. Conversely, damages may be sought in
circumstances in which prospective relief is not available because the plaintiff
cannot show a threat of future constitutional injury.161 Another illustration of
the accommodation principle in official immunity law involves the Court's
distinction between publicly-managed and privately-managed prisons. 6 2 In
the latter context, the policies underlying immunity are too weak to support a
defense.1 63 Yet another illustration concerns a distinction the Court draws
between administrative and executive officials, on the one hand, and certain
other officers. In a few narrow categories-connected with especially
sensitive judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions-the balance tips in
favor of absolute immunity from damages. And legislators, but only
legislators, are fully shielded from prospective injunctive relief.1 64
The accommodation model is most prominent in official immunity cases,
in part because the Supreme Court has grappled over the years with many

§ 1983 immunity cases. But the accommodation principle is a recurring
feature of most constitutional tort doctrines. Examples of the Court's efforts
to find a middle ground between competing values in this field include the
following:
*

When a government employee is fired and claims that the motive
for the dismissal was her protected speech, a causation issue
arises as to whether the firing was caused by the speech. The
Court does not merely apply the common law but-for test, which
puts the burden of proof exclusively on the plaintiff. In this area,

158. Id. at 818.
159. See Fallon, supra note 19, at 956 (noting "the Court's commitment to a robustly
protective doctrine of qualified immunity").
160. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
161. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). In Lyons, for example,
the plaintiff sued for damages for an allegedly illegal police chokehold. Id. at 95. But he also
sought an injunction that would forbid chokeholds in the future. Id. The Court ruled that his suit
for prospective injunctive relief could not proceed because he had not shown a likelihood that
he would be subjected to a chokehold in the future. Id. 95-96.
162. Richardsonv. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 402 (1997) (citing McKnightv. Rees, 88 F.3d
417, 425 (6th Cir. 1996)).
163. Id. at 404-05.
164. For discussion of these doctrines, see CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS, supra note 20, at 4989.
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the plaintiff is required to prove that the speech was a substantial
factor in the dismissal. But then the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to show that the plaintiff would have been fired for
some other reason. In other words, the Court has struck a balance
rooted in specialized burden-of-proof rules, a balance that takes
account of the importance of First Amendment rights and the
contrasting abilities of each party to marshal evidence in support
of that party's contentions.1 65
*

Under the Court's

§ 1983 "compensation principle," damages

may not be awarded "based on the abstract 'value' or
'importance' of constitutional rights."1 66 The purposes of
damages for constitutional torts are to compensate plaintiffs for
injuries caused by violations of constitutional rights and to deter
violations. But "there is no evidence that [Congress] meant to
establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the
award of compensatory damages,"' 6 7 unless the conduct is

egregious. 168
*

Local governments may not be sued for punitive damages,
because the balance of interests is different in this context than it
is for compensatory damages. Such an award is a "windfall to a
fully compensated plaintiff, and [is] likely to be accompanied by
an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the
citizens footing the bill."1

*

69

Similarly, the Court has declared more generally that common
law principles on damages may need to be modified, at least
sometimes, in the constitutional tort context because "the
interests protected by a particular constitutional right may not

165. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1976) ("The
constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no
worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct.").
166. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986).
167. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978).
168. See Smithv. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 49 (1983).
169. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981).
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also be protected by an analogous breach of the common law of
torts."1 70
State law ordinarily governs the issue of whether a § 1983 suit
survives the death of the plaintiff. But, as the Court has
recognized, the case for survival would be stronger, and an
exception to that deference to state law may be needed, if the
violation causes the death.' 7

*

To vindicate rights and deter violations, Congress has authorized
the award of a "reasonable" attorney's fee to a plaintiff who is a
"prevailing party" in § 1983 litigation.1 72 At the same time, if the
plaintiff invests substantial resources to obtain a large award, yet
obtains only token recovery, the appropriate fee will be zero. 7 3
Vindication and deterrence may require a substantial award even
if the plaintiff only obtains nominal damages, so long as "the
significance of the legal issue" warrants that result, or if the
litigation served "some public goal other than occupying the time
and energy of counsel, court, and client." 7 4 In any event, the
vindication and deterrence goals carry enough weight to
foreclose any rule that the fee must be reduced merely because it

'

*

is higher than the damages awarded.

'75

Very different, and far

less accommodating, attorney's fees rules apply when a
defendant seeks them. 7 6 Again, this difference in treatment
reflects a carefully thought-through evaluation of the proper

170. Carey, 435 U.S. at 258. Thus, some courts have allowed recovery of presumed
damages for certain constitutional violations, when the traditional damages rules do not seem
adequate to vindicate the constitutional right at stake or to provide adequate deterrence. See, e.g.,
Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Erwin v. County of Manitowoc,
872 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th Cir. 1989)); Walje v. City of Winchester, 827 F.2d 10, 13 (6th Cir.
1987).
171. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 594 (1986); see, e.g., Wheeler v. City of Santa
Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980)).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2018).
173. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115-16 (1992) (quoting City of Riverside v.
Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
174. Id. at 121-22 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's views are
especially important on these points, as the Court was divided 5-4, and she provided the swing
vote for the majority.
175. See Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574 (plurality opinion).
176. See, e.g., Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 828 (2011).
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incentives and disincentives to build into § 1983 in light of a
focused assessment of competing policy concerns.
Each of these doctrines may or may not reflect the optimal
accommodation of relevant § 1983 policies. The key point is that, however
debatable each of these rules may be, all of them reflect a common theme.
They support the proposition that as a routine practice in constitutional tort

litigation the Court works hard to accommodate the competing interests of
injured plaintiffs and state actors. There exists, in short, a deep-rooted,
accommodation-based approach to constitutional tort law. That approach has
long guided the resolution of the issues presented in § 1983 litigation and
should also guide the development of municipal liability doctrine.
C.

The Role of Fault in the Accommodation of Values

Under a negligence approach, governments would owe a duty of
reasonable care to avoid constitutional violations by their employees and
would be held liable if, but only if, their policymakers fail to meet that duty.
They would not escape liability, as they can today, just because the plaintiff
cannot prove policymakers' "conscious disregard" of violations by
subordinates.17 7

Liability

would

turn

on

whether

the

government's

policymakers have met an external standard, that of the reasonably prudent
persons in the circumstances. This objective approach serves the
accommodation goal of constitutional tort law because it strikes a balance
between competing interests.178 The advantage of negligence as a norm is that

it distinguishes, in broad but generally defensible ways, between cases in
which the values favoring liability are more likely to be especially strong and
177. Connickv. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011).
178. This notion of accommodation of competing interests is reflected in the Restatement's
core definition of negligence. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL

AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) ("Primary factors to consider in ascertaining
whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the
person's conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and
the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm."). It is also manifest in the
work of many torts scholars who have studied negligence. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons,
Negligence, 16 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 52, 90 (1999) ("Such an instruction invites juries to identify
and articulate the moral norms of the community."); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonablenessin
and out ofNegligence Law, 163 U. PA. L. REv. 2131, 2161 (2015) ("[T]he phrases 'reasonable
person' and 'reasonably prudent person' and the concept of a reasonable person connect with a
conception of reasonableness as the capacity to constrain one's behavior and choices in a manner
that is not wholly insensitive to others' need and wishes, but rather displays some sense of
mutuality."); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L. REv. 311, 312 (1996) ("When we act reasonably, we restrain our pursuit of self-interest
by acting in accordance with principles that fix fair terms of cooperation.").
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'

cases in which the social costs of liability are more likely to be especially
strong. 7 9 The decisive objection to the subjective deliberate indifference
doctrine of Harris and Brown is that it strikes the balance too far in the
direction of shielding governments from lawsuits. Unlike "reasonable care,"
it does not align with the "moral norms of the community."18 0 It permits local
governments to win due to insufficient evidence of conscious disregard, even
when the application of community standards favors the plaintiff. 8
1.

Ordinary Tort Law in

§ 1983 Litigation

Borrowing from private law to resolve a key problem of public law may
seem inappropriate because common law tort doctrine does not usually try to

take constitutional values into account.8 2 As Richard Fallon has persuasively
argued, it would be a mistake to treat "the common law of tort as a paradigm
of official accountability and liability for constitutional violations." 83 But it
is no less true that tort concepts can help in the resolution of certain
constitutional tort issues. Because many of the values at stake are similar
across all situations in which someone sues to recover for a non-contractual
past injury, the Court often has looked to ordinary tort concepts as a starting
point in adjudicating constitutional tort issues.184 The Court refers to common
law insights, resources, and guidance for two reasons. First, the common law
is relevant under general principles of statutory construction because

§ 1983

contains few specifics and was enacted "against the background of tort
179. Cf Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (adopting negligence as
the norm for accommodation of competing interests in reputation and freedom of speech in
defamation law).
180. Simons, supra note 178, at 90.
181. Adoption of "reasonable care" would not wholly banish the concept of subjective
deliberate indifference from municipal liability cases. In its due process jurisprudence, the Court
has chosen to define the substantive constitutional obligation, owed by both governments and
officers, as a duty not to harm persons by deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Lapre v. City of
Chicago, 911 F.3d 424, 438 (7th Cir. 2018);see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841
(1994). That use of the term is wholly distinct from its use as in policy or custom doctrine, in
which the issue is not the scope of constitutional rights but the scope of governmental liability
for constitutional violations, no matter how the substantive violations are defined.
182. See, e.g., Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to

Tort, 77 GEo. L.J. 1719, 1720 (arguing that "the Court, by using tort rhetoric, is attempting to
marginalize § 1983 and make it less protective of fourteenth amendment rights").
183. Fallon, supra note 19, at 997.
184. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 384 (2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 418 (1975)) (discussing the role of common law principles in constitutional tort);
see also Towerv. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). On post-1871 developments, see Rehberg
v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361-62 (2012); Kalinav. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123-24 (1997) (citing
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410); Owen v. City ofIndependence, 445 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1980).
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liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his
actions."1 85 The implication is that Congress intended to fill in the gaps by
reference to the common law. By contrast, the Monell Court's policy-orcustom formulation has no basis in the statute, the legislative history, or the
pre-Monell legal background.

Second, as a normative matter, the Court has found that ordinary tort rules
provide viable solutions for constitutional tort issues. Common law principles
are well-entrenched in § 1983 doctrine, including the rules on official
immunity,1 86 damages,1 87 proximate cause,1 88 and release-dismissal
agreements.18 9 The Court has emphasized that common law rules should not

be mechanically applied to constitutional torts.1 90 Tort concepts must be
adapted to the constitutional tort context in order to serve the distinctive needs
of § 1983 liability.191 Even so, the Court has routinely looked to tort law for
guidance in resolving

§ 1983 issues.1 92 This pattern of decisionmaking

comports with an even broader pattern of constitutional interpretation rooted
in recurring or traditional conventions of subconstitutional law.1 93
The anomaly in § 1983 doctrine is the one highlighted here-that is, the
all-but-complete lack of resort to ordinary tort principles in local government
liability cases. For some, this absence may be justified by conventional means
of statutory interpretation. In particular, the Court inMonell rejected vicarious
liability based on its reading of legislative history.1 94 But the Court's adoption
of policy or custom had no basis either in legislative history or in background
tort law. Furthermore, the anti-respondeat superior rule does not tell us the
extent to which other background common law doctrines should bear on
municipal liability. In particular, nothing in the legislative history of § 1983
suggests that courts should also reject the common law duty of reasonable
care. On that issue, the 42nd Congress was silent.
185. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); see also Larry Kramer & Alan O. Sykes,
Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249,
256-57 (discussing the legislative history).
186. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
187. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978).
188. See County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1548-49 (2017) (citing
Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444-45 (2014)).
189. See Town of Newtonv. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
190. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920-21 (2017) (quoting Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 258 (2006)).
191. See id. at 921; Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 384 (2012) (citing Imblerv. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976)); Rehbergv. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 366 (2012); Carey, 435 U.S. at 258.
192. Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 384 (citinglmbler,424 U.S. at 418).
193. See Dan T. Coenen,A Constitution ofCollaboration:ProtectingFundamentalValues

with Second-LookRules ofInterbranchDialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1575, 1713 (2001).
194. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
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(Objective) Negligence vs. (Subjective) DeliberateIndifference

As defined by Brown and Connick, deliberate indifference is a subjective
test.1 95 It requires a showing of "conscious disregard of an obvious risk."1 96 In

§ 1983 municipal liability cases, "[a] showing of simple or even heightened
negligence will not suffice" for deliberate indifference.1 97 Thus, it is not
enough that the policymaker should know because a reasonable person in his
position would know and act on that knowledge. The Court's description of
deliberate indifference in these cases resembles the Restatement of Tort's
definition of recklessness, which requires proof that "the person knows of the
risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious
to another in the person's situation."1 98 In

§ 1983 municipal liability cases,

courts have used this subjective and objective distinction as a basis for
rejecting liability under the deliberate indifference test even when the plaintiff
has produced proof of policymaker fault.1 99

195. As noted earlier, these later cases reject the objective approach to indirect liability,
which the Court had earlier seemed to adopt, albeit in dicta, in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994). But the shift has not been complete in the lower courts. See, e.g., Garza v. City
of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 637 (5th Cir. 2019) (relying on Farmer for the proposition that the test
is "objective deliberate indifference"). The thrust of this Article is that the key distinction is
between objective and subjective approaches and that the objective approach is preferable to the
subjective one. The terminology is not especially important. Thus, Garza, in substance, follows
the approach favored here, despite the Garza court's use of the term deliberate indifference.
From a tort perspective, however, it is worth noting that the "objective" approach to liability is
ordinarily called "negligence."
196. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997); see also Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011) ("Thompson had to show that it was so predictable that
failing to train the prosecutors amounted to conscious disregardfor defendants' Brady rights.").
For an illustrative circuit court case, see Schneider v. City of GrandJunctionPolice Department,

717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013) ("A local government policymaker is deliberately indifferent
when he deliberately or consciously fails to act when presented with an obvious risk of
constitutional harm which will almost inevitably result in constitutional injury of the type
experienced by the plaintiff." (quoting Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 745 (10th Cir.
1997))).
197. Brown, 520 U.S. at 407; see, e.g., Outlaw v. City of Hartford, 884 F.3d 351, 373 (2d
Cir. 2018).
198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
INST. 2010).

§2

(AM. LAW

199. See, e.g., Keith v. DeKalb County, 749 F.3d 1034, 1047 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Franklinv. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2013)) (explaining that deliberate indifference
is "conduct that is more than gross negligence"); Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov't,
806 F.3d 268, 279 (5th Cir. 2015); Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 128
(2d Cir. 2004) (noting that liability must be based on a "'conscious choice' rather than mere
negligence" (quoting City of Cantonv. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989))).
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A different approach better serves accommodation. To achieve the proper

'

balance among competing values, 20 0 municipal liability doctrine should give
due weight to all of the competing interests and not merely the interest in
avoiding any risk of vicarious liability. Following the model of ordinary tort
law, adjudication of the negligence issue for municipal liability would be an
objective test. It would require evaluation of the policymaker's conduct by the
standard of a reasonable policymaker, a test that is external to that officer. 20
Negligence turns not only on the subjective knowledge or motives of
policymakers, but also on their access to information and their ability to act
on it. 20 2 Negligence is especially well-suited to the task-often presented by
indirect-effect cases-of determining whether a policymaker's failure to act
is culpable. It is almost incoherent to talk about a conscious decision to
disregard a known risk in a failure-to-train case or a failure-to-address,
bottom-up-custom case. Omissions of this kind are seldom the product of
highly focused and deliberate thought, but such omissions may still reflect
failure to foresee events a reasonable person would have foreseen, or failure
to take remedial steps a reasonable person would have taken.
A rule that governments are liable if their policymakers fail to exercise
reasonable care to safeguard constitutional rights in indirect-effect cases
would align municipal liability doctrine with the accommodation principle.
Negligence-based liability would serve all of the competing policies, at least
to some extent. Plaintiffs would obtain vindication when they could show a
constitutional violation, causation of harm, and cognizable fault on the part of
government policymakers. In the same way, the negligence principle would
provide incentives for taking appropriate precautions against constitutional

violations by establishing the benchmark of unreasonableness. On the other
side of the balance, from the perspective of municipal defendants, the fault
principle would protect against the unfairness of imposing liability without
adequate warning. In addition, it would amply protect against the overly

burdensome liability, and attendant costs, associated with a strict liability
respondeat superior rule. As with any effort to accommodate competing
values, the negligence approach would fully satisfy the interests of neither
§ 1983 plaintiffs nor defendants. In particular, many victims of constitutional
violations will not be able to recover any damages at all. Even so, under a
reasonableness approach, plaintiffs will prevail in that set of cases in which
their interests are most pressing, and the same is true of local government
defendants.

200. Ziglarv. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017).
201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
INST. 2010).

202. See id.
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From the perspective of a plaintiff who will have already proven the
violation of his constitutional right, the goals of vindicating and deterring
constitutional violations point to negligence over current doctrine for a simple
reason: negligence produces liability more often and thus produces more
vindication and a stronger deterrent. On the other hand, ordinary tort law
principles dictate that fairness to defendants is adequately served by absolving
them from liability when either (a) they cannot reasonably foresee that one
alternative is less risky than another, 20 3 or (b) there is no safe choice because
all of the alternatives carry substantial risk. 20 4 The negligence principle
protects governments from liability for their policymakers' reasonable
responses to constitutional risk, but not when the policymaker has sufficient
knowledge, time, and resources to make safer choices.
In contrast to the negligence approach, deliberate indifference saves
governments from liability in cases in which policymakers do have the
information and the means to minimize constitutional risks but fail to take the
necessary curative steps based on their own inadequacy or laxity in failing
subjectively to recognize those risks. Governments are sure to argue, however
vaguely, that shifting from deliberate indifference to a reasonable care
standard would come at too high a price. But at the least, traditional tort
principles stretching back to Vaughan v. Menlove,20 the leading case on
negligence being an objective standard, suggest that such a claim is off the
mark. The durability of the negligence principle surely counts in its favor.
IV. REASONABLE CARE IN THE

§

1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CONTEXT

One advantage of a negligence-based approach is that it is a familiar
concept with a long history. As a result, there exist many cases that draw lines
between sets of facts as to which liability is or is not appropriate and set out
the respective roles of judge and jury in drawing those lines. The resolution
of policy or custom issues would benefit from the attention courts have given
203. See id. § 3 cmt. g; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) ("A choice which entails a concealed
consequence is as to that consequence no choice."). For an application of this general principle
as a rationale for official immunity for constitutional torts, see Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified
Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 588-89 (1998).
204. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. e
(AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also Raimondo v. Harding, 341 N.Y.S.2d 679, 681 (N.Y. App. Div.
1973) (quoting Townes v. Park Motor Sales, 180 N.Y.S.2d 553, 559 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958)).
205. 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (C.P. 1837); see also HOLMES, supra note 203, at 86-87
(defending the objective test on two grounds: (a) "the impossibility of nicely measuring a man's
powers and limitations," and (b) "when men live in society, a certain average of conduct . .. is
necessary to the general welfare"). In the constitutional tort context, these rationales simply
reinforce the vindication and deterrence goals of § 1983.
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to the development of negligence doctrine over the centuries. As we have
seen, the common law should not serve as a set of "prefabricated components"
for determining

§ 1983 liability. 206 Rather, "in applying, selecting among, or

adjusting common law approaches, courts must closely attend to the values
and purposes of the constitutional right at issue." 207 Put another way, it makes
perfect sense for the Court to borrow-and modify-common law negligence
principles as it deals with indirect-effectMonell actions. The ensuing sections
show how courts may fine-tune negligence principles to work well in the
municipal liability context without risking the collapse into respondeat
superior that the Court so greatly fears.
A.

Policymakers

Under a negligence model, municipal liability in indirect-effect cases
turns on whether the local government's policymakers have exercised
reasonable care. For this purpose, the relevant actors are not those employees
who handle the problem at hand but, instead, include a narrow band of
higher-ups who fall within the description of "some official or body that has
the responsibility for making law or setting policy in any given area of a local
government's business." 208 The Court distinguishes between the policymaker
and the actor who has violated the plaintiff's rights: "Once those officials who
have the power to make official policy on a particular issue have been
identified, it is for the jury to determine whether their decisions have caused
the deprivation of rights at issue." 20 9 No matter how badly a subordinate may
have behaved, the government is not liable unless the plaintiff shows the
requisite culpability on the part of the policymaker.

The workability of the reasonable care approach depends on adherence to
the distinction between policymakers and other officers. Lower courts have
not always maintained that distinction or have blurred the line between the
two. 210 Some courts treat delegation cases as instances in which "final
206. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 921 (2017) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547
U.S. 250, 258 (2006)); see also Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 (2019) (first quoting
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997); then quoting Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 921).
207. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 921.
208. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 125 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also
Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (citing Praprotnik,485 U.S. at 124
n.1) ("The trial judge must identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final
policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have
caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.").
209. Jett, 491 U.S. at 737.
210. See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 435 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that "results have sometimes proved inconsistent" and that "the location of
'policymaking' authority" is a "conceptually difficult problem").
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policymakers . . create [municipal] liability by . . delegating policymaking
authority to a subordinate." 2 11 Some courts hold that officers who are not
constrained by municipal policies are themselves policymakers. 212 In Webb v.
Sloan,213 for example, police in Carson City, Nevada, had mistakenly arrested
Webb. When the error was discovered, Webb refused to sign a
release-dismissal agreement, 214 by which he would have given up his false
arrest claim in exchange for dismissal of the criminal charge. In retaliation for
this, a deputy district attorney prosecuted Webb without probable cause. Upon
acquittal, Webb sued Carson City and the police officer and won a jury verdict
against the city. 215 The court affirmed on the ground that the deputy district
attorney was a municipal policymaker. 216 The court laid weight on a Nevada
statute that provided that deputy district attorneys "may transact all official
business relating to the officer to the same extent as their principals." 217 The
court reasoned that the statute dictated that "if principal district attorneys are
final policymakers, then so are their deputies." 218 Furthermore, "Carson City
presented no evidence that its principal district attorney actually has
constrained the deputies' authority," 219 thus suggesting that the district

211. Soltesz v. Rushmore Plaza Civic Ctr., 847 F.3d 941, 946 (8th Cir. 2017) ("In addition
to creating municipal liability for their own actions, final policymakers can also create this
liability by . . delegating policymaking authority to a subordinate."); see also Webb v. Town
of St. Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2019) ("A municipal employee may . . possess final
policymaking authority where the final policymaker has delegated that authority, either
expressly or impliedly."); Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 413 (4th Cir. 2016)
("[T]he fact that Dixon 'serves under the direction and control of the city manager' does not
necessarily establish that he lacked final authority to promulgate the policy."); Thompson v.
District of Columbia, 832 F.3d 339, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting that a lack of meaningful
oversight justifies finding a subordinate to be a policymaker).
212. See, e.g., Patel v. Hall, 849 F.3d 970, 979 (10th Cir. 2017). To determine whether an
actor is a policymaker, courts consider "whether the employee is meaningfully constrained by
policies not of his own making" and "whether his decisions are final, i.e., not subject to any
meaningful review." Id. (quoting Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3 411, 448 (10th Cir. 1995));
see also Kristofek v. Vill. of Orland Hills, 832 F.3d 785, 799 (7th Cir. 2016) (inquiring "whether
the official is constrained by policies of other officials or legislative bodies [and] whether the
official's decision on the issue in question is subject to meaningful review").
213. Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003).
214. Id.; see Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (upholding the validity of
release-dismissal agreements).
215. Webb, 330 F.3d at 1162-63. The prosecutor in such a case is absolutely immune from
§ 1983 liability. See Imblerv. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 409 (1976).
216. Webb, 330 F.3d at 1161.
217. Id. at 1164 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 252.070 (1) (2001)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1165. The court then noted that "[i]n fact, Carson City presented evidence to
the contrary," perhaps on the flawed theory that the city could win by showing that the deputy
was a renegade. Id.
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attorney's casualness in asserting his own authority created in his underlings
a sort of "pinch hitter" policymaker status. 220

Within a duty-of-reasonable-care framework for municipal liability, the
issue in Webb would be framed differently: The Carson City district attorney
would be the sole relevant policymaker for prosecutorial decisions. Municipal
liability would turn on whether the district attorney paid sufficient attention
to the selection, training, and supervision of deputies. Evidence that the
district attorney gave them free rein would help establish negligence on his
part. On proof that negligence caused a violation of Webb's constitutional
rights, Carson City would be liable under § 1983. But evidence of the district
attorney's casualness would not transform the deputy into a policymaker.
The general principle illustrated by this example is that all such cases
should depend on whether the higher-up officer has exercised reasonable care
in supervising the subordinate. If he has done so, the delegation of decision
making to the subordinate would not create liability, no matter how much
discretion the subordinate has exercised in the case at hand. By contrast, under
Webb every case turns on the vagaries of state law and highly contextual
assessments of whether and how much a recognized policymaker has assigned
to others his policymaking status. 221 In Webb, for example, the court
distinguished an earlier case in which it had held that "deputy prosecutors in
Hawaii did not have final policymaking authority," 222 on the ground that
Hawaii law operated differently. 223 The reasonable care approach does not
require this kind of state-by-state (and case-by-case) analysis. Under a
negligence approach, the issue is whether policymakers who delegate
authority to underlings should have foreseen the risk of constitutional
violations by the subordinates and should have taken steps to head off the
violation that occurred. Whether they have done so would depend, as it
should, on the application of negligence principles borrowed from tort law
and adapted to this purpose in specialized ways that are detailed below.
B.

Negligence Principles:Costs, Benefits, and Foreseeability

The negligence framework directs fact finders to balance the risks and
benefits of a precaution. 224 That approach has already influenced municipal
220. Pinch Hitter, DICTIONARY.COM, [https://www.dictionary.com/browse/pinch-hitter
https://perma.cc/2CH6-XRJ7 (defining "pinch hitter" as any substitute for another, especially in
an emergency).
221. Webb, 330 F.3d at 1165.
222. Id. (citing Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1999)).
223. Id. at 1165-66 (citing Christie, 176 F.3d at 1238).
224. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM.
LAW INST. 2010) ("[F]actors to consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks
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liability doctrine, even in the deliberate indifference regime. Some lower court
cases, though they frame the issue in terms of deliberate indifference, 225
identify circumstances that deserve consideration in a fault system. In Dunn
v. City ofElgin,226 an inadequate training case, the court described the relevant
factors:
Deliberate indifference may be shown in one of two ways. First, a
municipality shows deliberate indifference when it fails to train its
employees to handle a recurring situation that presents an obvious
potential for a constitutional violation and this failure to train results
in a constitutional violation. Second, a municipality shows deliberate
indifference if it fails to provide further training after learning of a
pattern of constitutional violations by the police. 227
Translated into the vocabulary of reasonable care, these two prongs
identify ways in which the likelihood of constitutional violations may become
sufficiently foreseeable to justify further training. The "recurring situation"
and the "pattern of constitutional violations" relate to the foreseeability of
violations and they are equally significant in fault-in-hiring, bottom-up
custom, ratification, and delegation cases. 228 The move to a negligence
standard would only modify the policymaker's standard, holding them to the
objective standard of a reasonable person. Liability may be appropriate even
when the potential for a constitutional violation is not quite as obvious, and a
pattern of constitutional violations may not be needed if other evidence
supports a finding of foreseeability.

reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm, the
foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or
reduce the risk of harm.").
225. Many opinions are not precise in their use of terms. Such courts may be applying
objective deliberate indifference, which is, in effect, the substantive norm proposed inthis article
under the heading of "negligence." See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
226. 347 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2003). For other illustrations of cost-benefit balancing,
see, for example, Littell v. Houston IndependentSchool District, 894 F.3d 616, 624-25 (5th Cir.
2018), where the court held that a jury could reasonably find deliberate indifference in an
intrusive school search case, in which the risk of constitutional violations was a recurring one
and the relevant officers received no training. "A jury could conclude that the severity of the
consequences of a friendly fire shooting forced the department to take notice of the high risk
despite the rarity of such an incident." Young v. City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d
4, 29 (1st Cir. 2005).
227. Dunn, 347 F.3d at 646 (first citing Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409
(1997); then citing Robles v. City of Fort Wayne, 113 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 1997); and then
citing Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1346 (7th Cir. 1997)).
228. Id. at 645-46.
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Cost-benefit analysis provides useful guidance in the law, but it is an
abstract concept and thus lacks the concrete specificity needed to guide the
adjudication of most tort issues, whether in common law negligence cases or
under § 1983. Ordinary tort law has generated a body of context-specific
principles for resolving negligence issues, and these principles furnish useful
analogs for use in § 1983 municipal liability cases. Four of these principles
seem especially pertinent: One involves "customary practice." Suppose, for

example, local governments follow some customary practices to minimize
constitutional violations. Either the plaintiff or the defendant may find it
helpful to introduce evidence of that practice and the policymaker's adherence
to or deviation from it.229 Similarly, policymaker fault sometimes will be
based on whether she followed a professional standard, as is the practice in
common law medical and legal malpractice litigation. 230 The second principle
is that of "negligence per se" for statutory violations. Under it, courts may
deem state or federal statutes or regulations relevant to the determination of
fault, especially if their purpose is to diminish the likelihood of constitutional
violations.23I Third, the principle of res ipsa loquitur applies when fault is

apparent from the event that caused injury: Some constitutional violations
may be so egregious that the policymaker in charge of preventing them can
be held liable without further evidence of fault, under the principle, that "the
thing speaks for itself." 232 Fourth, an actor may avoid liability even when his
action carries with it unmistakable dangers, provided the risk of not acting is
even more dangerous. 233 In Raimondo v. Harding, for example, the plaintiff

darted into traffic to escape attackers. 23 4 Though he could foresee danger from
the traffic, the court found that he exercised reasonable care under the
principle that his obligation is to act only "as a reasonably prudent person
would act under the same emergency circumstances." 235 Municipalities sued
under

§ 1983-particularly when sued for policymakers' responses to

emergencies-may benefit from this principle.

229. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTION HARM § 13 (AM. LAW
INST. 2010) (describing the role of custom in adjudicating the negligence issue).
230. See, e.g., Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 478 (1st Cir. 1994).
231. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 14-16
(discussing the role of statutory violations in adjudicating negligence).
232. Id. § 17 (discussing res ipsa loquitur).
233. Id. § 9. (stating that for both plaintiffs and defendants, negligence law takes into
account "an unexpected emergency requiring rapid response").
234. Raimondo v. Harding, 41 A.D.2d 63, 63-64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
235. Id. (quoting NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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C. Reshaping MunicipalLiability Doctrine
Adoption of a municipal duty of reasonable care to prevent constitutional
violations would treat delegation, ratification, bottom-up custom, inadequate
training, faulty hiring, and slipshod supervision as factual variations of a
single unitary theory of recovery. All of these fact patterns are tied together
by the same cords: first, a policymaker whose duties include oversight of a
subordinate; second, a constitutional violation by the subordinate; and third, a
causal connection between inadequate oversight and the constitutional
violation. Delegation, ratification, inadequate training, and bottom-up custom

all describe ways in which policymakers interact with subordinates. In any
large institution with a hierarchical structure, policymakers assign many
duties to subordinates, who then assign tasks to their subordinates, and on
down the line. When policymakers review and approve of decisions made by
underlings, their action seems to fit Justice O'Connor's ratification fact
pattern. When policymakers do not intervene, the policymaker's act can be
described as "delegation." When policymakers do not intervene against
widespread street-level practices, the facts may be described as bottom-up
custom. When the policymaker-subordinate relationship involves training,
hiring, or supervision, the fact pattern fits Harrisor Brown. Some fact patterns

will involve more than one of these features. For example, acquiescence in
decisions by subordinates may be described either as bottom-up custom, or as
delegation to subordinates. 23 6 Cursory review may be labeled as either
delegation or ratification. 237

It is useless to try to put fact patterns into pigeonholes when the
pigeonholes have no significance for the liability rule. This point is illustrated
in common law tort by Rowland v. Christian.238 In that case, the California

Supreme Court rejected the old categorical approach to land occupier liability,
with distinctions between trespassers, licensees, and invitees. That framework
did "not reflect the major factors which should determine whether immunity
should be conferred upon the possessor of land." 239 Instead of the categorical
approach, "the proper test . . [was] whether in the management of his
property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury
to others." 240 As with land occupiers, a municipal liability doctrine that
distinguishes among the categories does not help to identify instances in
which the case for liability is stronger or weaker. A more promising approach

236. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1256 (11th Cir. 2018).
237. See, e.g., Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Amnesty
Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004)).
238. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 568.
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would focus on whether the policymaker gives appropriate weight to the
protection of constitutional rights in interacting with subordinates under that
policymaker's supervision, regardless of whether the fact pattern reflects
delegation, ratification, bottom-up custom, inadequate training and hiring, or
some combination of them. In all of these situations, liability should turn on
whether policymakers exercised reasonable care.
Even so, there are reasons to pay attention to the fact patterns that shape
the current doctrine. Again, Rowland provides a helpful analogy. The court
observed that "the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in
the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the
question of liability." 241 Thus, for example, the variations among the
delegation, ratification, bottom-up custom and failure to train fact patterns
guide judges, jurors, and lawyers, simply because the variations identify the
specific questions that these individuals must address in determining fault in
a particular context and the evidence that bears on those questions. Tracking
Rowland's approach to common law land occupier liability, a fault-based
§ 1983 municipal liability doctrine would recognize that the differing contexts
in which policymakers act may well afford those policymakers different levels
of notice of constitutional danger and greater or lesser means to minimize
those dangers.
1.

Delegation

As we have seen, the issue in § 1983 delegation cases should not be
whether policymakers have delegated authority to make a decision but
whether policymakers are at fault in supervising subordinates to whom
authority has been given. Liability will often depend on the tasks that the
policymaker delegates and to whom they delegate those tasks. Key factors are
foreseeability of harm in a given context and opportunity to minimize
attendant risks. Policymakers, for example, would often be found at fault
when they fail to oversee subordinates' decisions that have an impact on many
people, but not so often when the foreseeable consequences of the
subordinate's decision are highly limited. Fault would be found more often
with regard to policymaker neglect of subordinates' decisions when those
decisions have constitutionally relevant consequences, such as oversight of
the local police, the jail, and the schools-as opposed, for example, to file
clerks or janitors. Policymakers also would be more often found at fault when
they have reason to know that a given subordinate has in the past acted in
unconstitutional, or arguably unconstitutional, ways.

241. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons,

39

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6
332

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71: 293]

A fault principle of this sort would not collapse into vicarious liability.
Many constitutionally relevant duties are delegated to street-level officers, but
supervision of their work is typically far removed from policymakers.
Policymakers would not be at fault for failing to oversee every act of every
police officer or school official because they will typically have little
opportunity to oversee that officer's actions. For example, in Davison v.
Randall, the policymakers were the Loudon County, Virginia Board of
Supervisors. 242 In retaliation for Davison's protected speech, Louise Randall,
the chair of the board, banned Davison from the chair's Facebook page. 243

Loudon County was not liable for Randall's violation of Davison's First
Amendment rights, because this was "a one-off unilateral decision . . . in the

heat of the moment." 244 Absent a pattern of such behavior by Randall, this
case seems rightly decided under the negligence approach. One-off events are
often unforeseeable. 245 On the other hand, delegation is not an all-purpose
shield against municipal liability, as it seems to be for a few courts. For
example, Penley v. McDowell County Boardof Education held that a "county

board of education 'cannot be held liable for personnel decisions over which
it did not retain final review authority. "'246 From a negligence perspective, the
issue is not whether the Board of Education retained final review authority,
but whether it acted reasonably in turning over all of its authority to
subordinates, especially without any follow-up supervision.
The negligence principle holds that it is sometimes reasonable to delegate
decision making to subordinates without review, when the circumstances
indicate the unlikelihood of constitutional violations. This may be true, for
example, of the fire department or the municipal water and trash collection
office, at least until complaints begin to surface. Other instances of delegation
may present a greater likelihood of constitutional violations and thus a need
for closer supervision in a reasonable care regime. In Gschwind v. Heiden,247

for example, an Illinois teacher sued a school district on free speech grounds
when, on the recommendation of the principal, the school board fired him.
According to the court, "[i]n Illinois the school board is the ultimate

242. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 673 (4th Cir. 2019).
243. Id. at 675.
244. Id. at 690 (quoting Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702,
715 (E.D. Va. 2017)).
245. See, e.g., Larsonv. St. Francis Hotel, 188 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (holding
that a hotel was not liable for a guest throwing a chair out the window during a sudden
celebration of the end of World War II).
246. Penley v. McDowell Cty. Bd. of Educ., 876 F.3d 646, 653 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004)).
247. Gschwind v. Heiden, 692 F.3d 844, 845-46 (7th Cir. 2012).
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policymaking body with regard to personnel decisions." 24 8 But the school

board "allow[ed] principals and assistant principals to make evaluation and
employment decisions as they s[aw] fit . .. and the Board of Education

follow[ed] these decisions and recommendations." 24 9 The court found that the
plaintiff stated a good claim against the school district because "[t]his was
evidence of a policy of . .. condoning unconstitutional terminations." 25 0
Under a negligence approach, this outcome could not rest solely on the
delegation of authority to the principal, as it evidently did for the court.
Instead, the issue would be whether the school board acted with reasonable
care in giving principals such broad discretion. The result may well be the
same, since teachers often charge school authorities with free speech
violations, and not infrequently prevail on the merits. A similar broad
delegation, however, would probably not justify a finding of fault on the
policymaker's part if the aggrieved employee worked for the municipal water
department, a line of work that produces much less First Amendment
litigation.
2.

Ratification

When policymakers more actively oversee decisions by subordinates, the
degree of oversight may justify characterization of the case as "ratification"
rather than "delegation." 251 In such cases, policymakers who undertake to
monitor their subordinates' work should be obliged to take reasonable care to
minimize the risk of constitutional violations. It should not be necessary to
show that the policymaker "consciously chose to ignore" violations. 252 The
specific facts of a given instance of ratification bear on the determination of
what a reasonable policymaker, considering available resources, should know
about the incident and what a reasonable policymaker could do to limit
248. Id. at 847 (citing 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20, 20.7 (1990)).
249. Id. at 848 (internal quotation marks omitted).
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004)
("Another method of implicating a policymaking official through subordinates' conduct is to
show that the policymaker was aware of a subordinate's unconstitutional actions, and
consciously chose to ignore them."). When the policymaker does not just oversee subordinates,
but makes the decision himself, as in the hypothetical case provided by Justice O'Connor in
Praprotnik,the case is one of direct-effect liability, as she recognized. See City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion). For example, in Pembaur, municipal
liability was based on the single act of the district attorney, who told the police to enter the
doctor's office. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 469 (1986). There is no legally
significant difference between that event and a variation in which the police officers recommend
entry and the policymaker ratifies that decision. If the ultimate decision is for the policymaker,
the subordinate does not ever make a decision, only a recommendation.
252. AmnestyAm., 361 F.3d at 126.
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constitutional risk. In a case like Praprotnik, liability would depend on facts
that were never established, because they were not relevant, under the Court's
approach. In a negligence regime, it would be important to determine whether

St. Louis policymakers knew or should have known of the risk that Hamsher,
Praprotnik's immediate supervisor, would violate First Amendment rights. If

similar incidents had occurred in the past, or if Hamsher had indicated a
particular hostility to Praprotnik's protected speech, these warning signs

would have required heightened attention from policymakers, and their failure
to at least investigate the circumstances of Hamsher's treatment of Praprotnik
might justify a finding of fault.
3.

Custom

Though the policymaker's role in bottom-up custom cases is factually
distinct from delegation and ratification, it should be governed by the same
obligation of reasonable care. When policymakers know enough about
street-level practice to make choices about further investigation, their
negligence in ignoring the risk of violations is an adequate ground for
imposing liability on the municipality, just as if they had delegated authority
without sufficient oversight or implicitly ratified an underling's decision
despite reasons to doubt the constitutional validity of the grounds for that
decision. 253 Custom implies a widespread practice. 254 Under a negligence
approach, however, the key factor is foreseeability. In some cases, the custom
may arise out of only a few instances of unconstitutional conduct. In Baron v.
Suffolk County Sheriff's Department, 255 the plaintiff successfully proved a

custom of informal punishment of jail employees who informed authorities of
constitutional violations by coworkers, despite an inability to show a pattern
of such punishments of any officers other than the plaintiff. In situations like
this one, a custom-here, of improper punishment-results from only a few
instances in which a plaintiff shows that he was abused. In upholding his
claim, the court explained that a custom of informal abuse for snitching would

253. See, e.g., Winkler v. Madison County, 893 F.3d 877, 902 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing
Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, at 763 (6th Cir. 2006)) (explaining that plaintiff
discussed only one instance "and therefore cannot establish that the County had a custom of
deliberate indifference to the serious healthcare needs of all of the inmates").
254. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (quoting Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). For applications of this principle, see, for
example, Regains v. City of Chicago, 918 F.3d 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2019); Malone v. Hinman, 847
F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2017); Velazquez v. City ofLong Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1027 (9th Cir.
2015) (quoting Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2011)).
255. 402 F.3d 225 (1st Cir. 2005).
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probably dissuade snitching and thus lead to few instances of abuse. 256 By
contrast, the city might well prevail if it can show that other officers who
snitched on their colleagues were not punished, as policymakers on these facts
would have less reason to suspect a pattern of harassment was afoot.
4.

Inadequate Training, Hiring, and Supervision

In cases of inadequate training, hiring, and supervision, a reasonable care

approach would probably produce different outcomes on the liability issue in
Brown 25 7 and Connick.258 Both of these cases overturned jury verdicts for
plaintiffs under the stringent deliberate indifference standard, 25 9 which is not
satisfied by "[a] showing of simple or even heightened negligence." 260 In both

cases, the jury instructions were proper. The Court focused on the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the juries' verdicts. 261 To be sure, these verdicts
may be questioned under the deliberate indifference test. The Court in Brown
may have correctly rejected the jury's finding that Sheriff Moore was
deliberately indifferent to constitutional rights in hiring Deputy Bums. 262
Even if that were so, however, Burns' history of minor criminal-law violations
provided notice to the sheriff that Burns might endanger constitutional rights,
thus justifying a jury verdict that Moore violated the duty of reasonable
care. 263
In Connick, courts had overturned four convictions for Brady violations

by New Orleans' district attorney's office over the past decade, though the
factual backgrounds of those rulings differed from the plaintiff's case. 264 The

Court agreed with District Attorney Connick that "Thompson did not prove
that he was on actual or constructive notice of, and therefore deliberately
indifferent to, a need for more or different Brady training." 265 Under a

reasonable care approach, the four earlier violations could well have
supported a jury verdict that the district attorney should have understood the
risk of future violations and taken action to prevent them. A reasonable jury
thus could determine that Connick should have foreseen this type of future

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See id. at 237-38.
See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 414-16 (1997).
563 U.S. 51 (2011).
Id. at 70.
Brown, 520 U.S. at 407.
Id. at 412.
See id. at 415.
See id. at 419-20 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Connick, 563 U.S. at 62-63.
Id. at 59.
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constitutional violation, even if earlier violations differed in some respects. 266
At the least, negligence doctrine would not have dictated, as the Court's ruling
did, that a "pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees
is 'ordinarily necessary' to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes
of failure to train." 267 Under the negligence test, reasonable foreseeability is
the key to liability, and such foreseeability may be shown by other means in
addition to a history of on-all-fours past violations. 268
5.

Cases That Fall Outside the Categories

Some lower court cases do not fit neatly into any of these categories, yet
the case for liability is strong, because the vindication and deterrence policies
are strong. The reasonable care principle provides a useful framework for
adjudicating them. For example, in Hill v. Cundiff policymakers had adopted
the "catch in the act" rule under which public schools could not discipline
students for sexual harassment absent eyewitness testimony. 269 A teacher's
aide devised a scheme by which a female student would serve as "rape bait"
and the male aggressor would be caught in the act.270 The scheme backfired,
however, and the student was tragically raped. 271 The court dismissed the
student's § 1983 suit against the school district, evidently on the ground that
the plaintiff had not shown deliberate indifference. 272 Taking its cue from the
failure-to-train cases, the court said that "[t]he Board could not have foreseen
a rape-bait scheme that required an eighth-grade student to voluntarily subject
herself to sexual harassment as a 'known or obvious consequence' of the
'catch in the act' policy or its training policies. "273

In a reasonable care regime, the Board's conduct would be evaluated
under an objective standard. The outcome may have been different, as the risk
of such a scheme may be one the Board should have considered even if it was
not a "known or obvious consequence."274 In particular, some judges might
266. See id. at 62-63 ("None of those cases involved failure to disclose blood evidence, a
crime report, or physical or scientific evidence of any kind.").
267. Id. at 62 (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 409); see, e.g., Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534,
552 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2001));
Brownv. Battle Creek Police Dep't, 844 F.3d 556, 575 (6th Cir. 2016).
268. Cf Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 US. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)) (explaining that even under the deliberate
indifference test, foreseeability can sometimes be found without a pattern).
269. Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 957-58 (11th Cir. 2015).
270. Id. at 971-72.
271. Id. at 963.
272. See id. at 977-78.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 985.
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conclude that the school system's draconian and unorthodox catch in the act
rule may well lead to dangerous enforcement efforts of some kind, thus at
least raising a duty to secure approval from the school principal before
schemes to catch wrongdoers were launched.
While the facts of Hill are unlikely to recur, the case illustrates a larger
point about governmental responsibility for constitutional violations, a point
made by Christina Whitman long ago. As Professor Whitman observed:
"[I]njuries can be brought about quite inadvertently through the workings of
institutional structures-through the massing or fragmentation of authority, or
by the creation of a culture in which responses and a sense of responsibility
are distorted." 275

The categorical approach that currently dominates § 1983 municipal
liability doctrine does not provide a neat doctrinal pigeonhole for cases such
as Hill in which, at least arguably, a systemic institutional breakdown of one
kind or another has occurred, but no specific policymaker has demonstrated
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. A strength of the reasonable
care model is that it provides a framework that identifies the issues that need
to be resolved to adjudicate such cases.
V.

DOES NEGLIGENCE-BASED LIABILITY COLLAPSE INTO RESPONDEAT

SUPERIOR?

Much of the Supreme Court's § 1983 indirect municipal liability doctrine
is shaped by the Court's determination to avoid vicarious liability. In Brown,
for example, the Court warned that "[w]here a court fails to adhere to rigorous
requirements of culpability and causation, municipal liability collapses into

275. Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibilityfor ConstitutionalTorts, 85 MICH.

L. REV. 225, 226 (1986). Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016),
illustrates some of the problems identified by Professor Whitman. In Castro,a pre-trial detainee
was beaten while housed in a "sobering cell." Id. at 1065. The government's liability was based
on the following:
[T]he poor design and location of the sobering cell, ... a custom of housing
intoxicated inmates in sobering cells that contained inadequate audio
monitoring[,] . . [and] a policy to check on inmates only every 30 minutes.... These
routine practices were consciously designed and, together, they amount to a custom
or policy.
Id. at 1075; see also Newtonv. City of New York, 779 F.3d 140, 153-56 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding
that deficiencies in the City's evidence management system were responsible for plaintiff's
illegal incarceration, thus justifying municipal liability). The court upheld a finding of
"recklessness or deliberate indifference" to plaintiff's rights. Id. at 156. For present purposes,
the distinctive feature of these cases is that, like Hill, they are not direct municipal liability cases,
yet neither do they fall squarely into any of the categories traditionally associated with indirect
liability.
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respondeat superior liability." 276 This line of reasoning is difficult to

understand because the only formal step needed to avoid respondeat superior
is to reject respondeat superior, as the Court did in Monell. Put simply, a
properly applied negligence rule would not impose respondeat superior any

more than does the deliberate indifference test.
Formal doctrine aside, the Court has feared the practical consequences of
lowering the hurdle for plaintiffs in real-world litigation. It said in Connick
that "[a] less stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train 'claim would
result in de facto respondeat superior liability' .... "277 But why does the
Court fear that a fault-based system would collapse into vicarious liability?
This question does not receive any answer in the Court's opinions. Perhaps

the Justices worry that juries, in the application of a less stringent standard of
liability, would too readily find fault and that lower courts would fail to
control juries. Under a more stringent standard, such as deliberate
indifference, plaintiffs will win less often, and thus they will rarely win cases
that they deserve to lose.
But the Court's position has an important corollary that the majority is
understandably reluctant to articulate in its opinions: To the extent the
imposing obstacle of deliberate indifference is justified solely by the need for
an extra layer of insulation from liability to ward off the menace of a collapse
into vicarious liability, the merit of the deliberate indifference test turns on
whether the extra layer is actually needed. If that layer is in fact superfluous,
or largely so, the logical implication is that plaintiffs who face deliberate
indifference also lose cases that they may deserve to win.
Seen in this light, the Court's stance rests on two unarticulated,
unexamined, and unsupported assumptions. First, it seems to assume that
judges and juries charged with applying the negligence principle will often
drift into respondeat superior, a strict liability approach. 278 Second, the Court
seems to ignore other means for controlling overly broad liability, such that a
276. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997); see also id. at 410 ("To
prevent municipality liability for a hiring decision from collapsing into respondeat superior
liability, a court must carefully test the link between the policymaker's inadequate decision and
the particular injury alleged.").
277. Connickv. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting City of Cantonv. Harris, 489

US. 378, 392 (1989)).
278. The Justices may be influenced by what they learned in law school decades ago. For
a time in the late twentieth century, it appeared that strict liability may replace negligence as
the dominant test for ordinary tort liability. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of
EnterpriseLiability: A CriticalHistory ofthe IntellectualFoundationsofModern Tort Law, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 516 (1985). However, the negligence standard appears to have successfully
withstood the assault. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 244-90 (expanded ed. 2003) (discussing "the unexpected persistence
of negligence, 1980-2000"); James A. Henderson, Why Negligence DominatesTort, 50 UCLA
L. REV. 377 passim (2002).
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super strict, state-of-mind requirement is deemed necessary to achieve the
proper constraint. The Court's approach, however, gives too little credit to the
ability of judges and juries to maintain the integrity of negligence law-just
as the law calls upon them to do in countless numbers of ordinary tort cases,
including cases brought against cities. It is not necessary to sacrifice the
benefits of an accommodation-oriented approach to municipal liability for the
sake of avoiding a hypothetical problem. Even if the danger has some possible
grounding in reality, its speculative and uncertain quality must be weighed
against the undeniable fact that under current law the victims of constitutional
violations automatically lose their cases when they can only show that the
municipal defendant has acted unreasonably.
The ensuing subsections discuss two reasons to question the validity of
the Court's concern that a reasonable care approach would collapse into
vicarious liability: First, courts have successfully maintained the viability of
the distinction between negligence and respondeat superior in other contexts.
Second, the tort law concepts of cause-in-fact and proximate cause provide
effective means for addressing the Court's "no liability without
responsibility" concern in a more focused way than does deliberate
indifference, all without a wholesale sacrifice of injured plaintiffs' legitimate
interest in vindication and deterrence of constitutional violations.
A.

The Distinction Between Negligence and Respondeat Superior in
Other Contexts

In Monell, the Court moved from rejection of anti-respondeat superior to
adoption of policy or custom in two sentences, as though no other alternatives
were available. 279 And yet, in the context of negligent hiring and supervision,
common law courts routinely distinguish between vicarious liability and other
theories of liability. 280 That distinction is illustrated by the large and complex
body of law on the "course of employment" issue. Thus, the Restatement of
Agency declares that an employee's act occurs in the course of the
employment only if "it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master." 281 Illustrations of the body of law devoted to distinguishing between

respondeat superior and other theories of liability include cases that

279. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
280. Eg., Schechter v. Merchants Home Delivery, Inc., 892 A.2d 415, 431 (D.C. 2006)
("Potential recovery in tort for negligent hiring or retention of an employee is not based on
respondeatsuperior, but rather on proof of negligence on the part of the employer himself."
(citing Fleming v. Bronfin, Inc., 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C. 1951)); Freeman v. Bell, 366 So. 2d
197, 199 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
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distinguish between "frolic and detour," 282 cases that focus on employer fault
when the activity is clearly not within the scope of the employment, 283 and
cases that ask whether the defendant has given "apparent authority" to the
tortfeasor.284 The very persistence of these doctrines demonstrates their

workability and suggests that courts are fully capable of maintaining the
integrity of rules that base liability on employer fault without falling into
vicarious liability.
Developments in public law also support the viability of negligence-based
liability. Indeed, the Court itself recently adopted an approach that
distinguishes between respondeat superior and negligence in the context of
sexual harassment claims brought against employers under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Vance v. Ball State University,285 the Court held

that the employer would not be liable on a respondeat superior basis for such
claims unless the harasser was someone whom "the employer has
empowered . . . to take tangible employment actions against the victim." 2 86
More particularly, it went on to conclude that "[n]egligence provides the better
framework for evaluating an employer's liability when a harassing employee
lacks the power to take tangible employment actions." 28 7 Justice Alito's
majority opinion framed the issue as a choice between negligence and
vicarious liability, contained nothing to suggest any worries that negligence
may collapse into respondeat superior, and did not consider adoption of a
deliberate indifference test as an alternative approach. 288 Justice Alito noted
that the "negligence standard . .. is thought to provide adequate protection for
tort plaintiffs in many other situations"289 and expressed confidence that
negligence could handle "the variety of situations that will inevitably arise"
in non-supervisor harassment cases. 290 An implicit premise of the Court's
reasoning is thatjudges and juries will be able to maintain the negligence and
vicarious liability distinction. Vance, to say the least, casts doubt on the
Court's apparent distrust of the ability or willingness of federal courts to
maintain the exact same distinction in § 1983 municipal liability cases.
282. See, e.g., Coe v. Carroll & Carroll, Inc., 709 S.E.2d 324, 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
283. See, e.g., Schechter, 892 A.2d at 427, 432 (finding that workers who committed
robbery were clearly outside the scope of their employment, but the employer could be held
liable based on negligent hiring and supervision).
284. See, e.g., Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756, 765 (Ill. 1999).
285. 570 U.S. 421 (2013).
286. Id. at 431. Thus, the Court in Vance distinguished between sexual harassment by
coworkers and by supervisors. See id. at 432.
287. Id. at 439.
288. The Court was split 5-4. Id. at 422. Justice Alito wrote for the majority. Id. Justice
Ginsburg dissented, in an opinion joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Id.
289. Id. at 446.
290. Id.
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Other Constraints on Liability: Causation in Fact and Proximate
Cause

The Court has paid too little attention to the other means courts have at
their disposal to ensure that governments are held liable only for those
constitutional injuries fairly attributable to municipal policies and customs.
To begin with, neither a government nor an official can be held liable without
proof of actual harm because "the abstract value of a constitutional right may
not form the basis for § 1983 damages." 291The Court also has provided local
governments with an extra level of protection by banning punitive damages
against municipalities in § 1983 suits. 292 Although adoption of the negligence
approach would lower the hurdles that block access to relief for some
plaintiffs, it would also bring into focus the far-from-unlimited nature of
municipal liability. Among other things, the negligence approach would
demand reasonable care on the part of high-level officers and would cut back
existing opportunities for recovery by disapproving of cases in which lower
courts have named low-level officials as policymakers. 293 A negligence-based

approach also would reject the analytical framework of cases like Gschwind
v. Heiden,294 in which courts have treated delegation as a stand-alone for
liability, without regard to the reasonableness of the policymakers' choice to
reassign decisionmaking to a subordinate.295

Ordinary tort principles accord considerable weight to the goal of
assuring that liability is not imposed unless an actor is responsible for the
plaintiff's harm. Besides fault, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show
that the defendant's negligent act is both the cause in fact of the harm and the
proximate cause of the injury. Indeed, as the ensuing discussion highlights,
both Brown 296 and Connick297 overturned jury verdicts for insufficient
evidence of deliberate indifference, while ignoring opportunities to employ
cause-in-fact and proximate-cause principles to assure that municipalities are
not held liable unless they are truly responsible for constitutional injuries. 298

291. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986).
292. See generally City of Newportv. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (explaining
that the legislative history regarding the enactment of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
suggested that Congress did not intend "to abolish the doctrine of municipal immunity from
punitive damages").
293. See cases cited supra notes 211-33 and accompanying text.
294. 692 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2012).
295. See cases cited supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
296. See generally Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
297. See generally Connickv. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011).
298. See generally id.
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Cause-in-Factin Connick v. Thompson

The issue in Connick was whether New Orleans was subject to liability
for supervisors' failure to train assistant district attorneys about their Brady
obligation to provide exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants. 299 Despite
a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the Court held that the plaintiff had not shown
deliberate indifference on the part of District Attorney Connick, the final
policymaker. 300 Brady is a well-known criminal procedure rule. In his opinion

for the Court, Justice Thomas pointed out that assistant district attorneys have
plenty of opportunities to learn about it, not only in law school and in
preparing for the bar but also in continuing legal education courses as well.301
Justice Thomas linked Brady's prominence to the deliberate indifference
standard. 30 2 He reasoned that, in light of these many opportunities to learn
about Brady, "recurring constitutional violations are not the 'obvious
consequence' of failing to provide prosecutors with formal, in-house training
about how to obey the law." 303

Close inspection reveals, however, that Justice Thomas's fancy footwork
with the deliberate indifference standard diverted attention from the strongest
objection to recovery in the Connick case: Even if Thompson could establish
a violation of the City's duty of care, the city would probably have had a
causation-based defense-a defense that would have been available even if
the liability rule were negligence rather than deliberate indifference. 304 The
black-letter doctrine on cause in fact is that "[c]onduct is a factual cause of
305
harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct."
Thompson's prosecutors failed to comply with Brady despite many

opportunities to learn about that rule and the consequences of violating it.
Their conduct in the face of the opportunities belies the notion that a lack of
in-house training made a difference. 306 To be sure, a court might have
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 54-57.
Id. at 71-72.
See id. at 64-65.
See id. at 71.
Id. at 66 (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).
See id. at 84 n.5 (noting but not addressing the causation issue).

305. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 26 (AM.

LAW

INST. 2010); see, e.g., Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 318 (5th Cir. 2018)
("[Beneficiaries] have failed to present evidence that additional training would have prevented
[the decedent's] injuries.").
306. See also Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 390-91 (5th Cir. 2018) (stating
that failure to provide plaintiff with evidence was due to a "series of interconnected errors within
the Brownsville Police Department that involved individual officers" and this series of errors
was "separate from the general policy of non-disclosure of information.... The general policy
of non-disclosure was not a direct cause of Alvarez's injury").
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concluded that Connick's failure to train was one of several causes of the
Brady violation, triggering application of the principle that any one of a set of
multiple sufficient causes may be held liable.3 07 Yet New Orleans might well
have won despite this principle. Just as a defendant who negligently starts a
small fire may not be held liable when it joins with a much larger one, New
Orleans' negligent failure to provide adequate in-house training may have
made only a trivial contribution to the causal set of circumstances that led to
the Brady violation. 308

There is a further point to be made on the topic of cause-in-fact as a tool
for limiting municipal liability. In the common law, "policy considerations
frequently exert their influence when we attempt to resolve a simple cause
inquiry .... "309 That being so, the policy of limiting municipal governments'

exposure to liability without responsibility can be implemented by requiring
especially strong proof of cause-in-fact for the plaintiff to avoid summary
judgment or judgment for the defendant "as a matter of law" in a § 1983
municipal liability case. 310
2.

Proximate Cause in Board of County Commissioner v. Brown

Sheriff B.J. Moore, the county policymaker responsible for hiring
deputies, employed Burns without first checking his background. 311 Burns
then used excessive force in pulling Brown from her car.3 12 Although
investigation would have revealed Burns' previous misdemeanor convictions
for a number of crimes, including one for assault and battery, 313 the Court
overturned a jury verdict for Brown against Bryan County. 3 14 Applying the

deliberate indifference test, the Court found "insufficient evidence on which
a jury could base a finding that Sheriff Moore's decision to hire Burns
reflected conscious disregard of an obvious risk that use of excessive force
would follow." 315 Under a negligence standard, the culpability threshold
307. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 2010).
308. Id. § 36.
309. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause in Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 97 (1956).
310. Cf Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1724 (2019) (requiring the plaintiff in a
retaliatory arrest case to prove not only that unconstitutional animus motivated the arrest but
also that the officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest because in such cases "it is
particularly difficult to determine whether the adverse government action was caused by the
officer's malice or the plaintiff's potentially criminal conduct").
311. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rsv. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 401 (1997).
312. See id. at 400-01.
313. Id. at 401.
314. Id. at 416.
315. Id. at 415.

Published by Scholar Commons,

51

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6
344

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71: 293]

would be lower and the Court would have been hard-pressed to find the
evidence insufficient to support a verdict for Brown.
Even so, Bryan County might well have won the case on proximate cause
grounds, regardless of the plaintiff's demonstration of fault and causation in
fact. The relevant black-letter rule provides that "[a]n actor's liability is
limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct
tortious."316 The risk that made Sheriff Moore's conduct tortious is that Burns
would use excessive force, but the main evidentiary basis for Burns'
propensity for violence was a "single incident" in which he had pleaded guilty
to misdemeanor assault and battery, public drunkenness, and resisting
arrest.3 17 These charges arose "from a fight on a college campus where Burns
was a student." 318 From a proximate cause perspective, Bryan County might

well prevail even if Moore was negligent in hiring Burns because of the
difference between the rowdiness one could foresee from Burns and the
serious misuse of power on his part that occurred during the traffic stop.
Indeed, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court gestures toward this very
rationale. Thus, "culpability . . must depend on a finding that this officer was
highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff." 319 The

difference between a fault-based regime and the Court's approach is that,
within the former, culpability and liability would be distinct issues. And while
culpability would be established by showing negligence, liability would
depend on demonstrating a meaningful causal link between the policymaker's
negligence and the constitutional violation. 320
Whether a particular link is sufficiently close to produce liability would
depend on whether, in the particular context, recovery would further the
316. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 29 (AM.

LAW

INST. 2010). For illustrations of this rule to § 1983 municipal liability, see, for example,
Eisenhour v. Weber County, 897 F.3d 1272, 1280 (10th Cir. 2018), and Black Earth Meat
Market, L.L.C. v. Village ofBlack Earth, 834 F.3d 841, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2016).
317. Brown, 520 U.S. at 401.
318. Id. at 413.
319. Id. at 412.
320. Cf Wilson v. Cook County, 742 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2014). In this case, a government
employee named Vanaria had, in an earlier government job as a probation officer, coerced
female probationers to have sex with him. Id. at 777. He was fired from that job, but seven years
later he was rehired for another government job. Id. at 778. He then "used the promise of a phony
job to convince" another woman to have sex with him. Id. at 777. According to the court,
"[g]iven the passage of time without incident and the fact that Vanaria had aged seven years, it
is difficult to conclude that Vanaria's misconduct with respect to [the second woman] was so
obvious that any jury could find causation or deliberate indifference." Id at 782. However, even
if the policymakers who rehired Vanaria were not deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's rights,
a jury could surely find that the later misconduct was reasonably foreseeable in light of his earlier
behavior, and plaintiff would satisfy both fault and proximate cause under a negligence-centered
regime.
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vindication and deterrence aims of constitutional tort enough to justify the
costs of municipal liability. In ordinary tort law, courts use proximate cause
doctrine to answer the question of whether fault and injury relate closely
enough to justify recovery.3 21 Brown illustrates the relevance of these
common law principles to a particular set of facts.3 22 In certain types of § 1983
litigation, proximate cause principles may produce categorical limits on
liability. For example, the main common-law proximate cause principle limits
liability "to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's
conduct tortious." 323 John Jeffries has argued, by analogy, that "compensation

for violations of constitutional rights should encompass only constitutionally
relevant injuries-that is, injuries within the risks that the constitutional
prohibition seeks to avoid."3 24 He suggests, for example, that municipal
liability for shutting down an adult bookstore in violation of the owner's First
Amendment rights may not extend to the economic loss from fewer customers
and purchases because "the damage to [the] business enterprise is not the sort
of injury that the first amendment is concerned to prevent."3 25 The point, for
present purposes, is not to endorse Jeffries' (admittedly tentative) resolution
of the hypothetical.3 26 The point is that limitations rooted in proximate cause
principles under common law can be employed to narrow municipal liability
within a fault system, without obliging the plaintiff to meet a stringent
deliberate indifference test.
VI. CONCLUSION

Critics of the Court's Monell doctrine include several Supreme Court
Justices. Writing in dissent for himself and two others in Brown,3 27 Justice
321. See Albert Levitt, Cause, Legal Cause and Proximate Cause, 21 MICH. L. REV. 34,

54 (1922).
322. See Black Earth Meat Mkt., L.L.C. v. Vill. of Black Earth, 834 F.3d 841, 849 (7th
Cir. 2016) ("There were four steps between the Village's threat of litigation and all the
deprivations except [one, as to which there were] .... three intermediate causal steps.").
323. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (AM. LAW
INST. 2010); see also id. § 30 ("An actor is not liable for harm when the tortious aspect of the
actor's conduct was a type that does not generally increase the risk of that harm."); id. § 34
("When a force of nature of an independent act is also a factual cause of harm, an actor's liability
is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious.").
324. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damagesfor ConstitutionalViolations: The Relation ofRisk to
Injury in ConstitutionalTorts, 75 VA. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (1989).
325. Id. at 1481.
326. Jeffries acknowledges that "[a]n instrumental rationale [for liability for the economic
loss] might well exist," in that "[t]he prospect of damages no doubt would help deter
unconstitutionality and would encourage government to take great pains to know (or anticipate)
the law." Id. at 1483.
327. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rsv. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Breyer directed his fire at the "basic distinction [drawn in Monell] between
liability that rests upon policy and liability that is vicarious." 328 As Justice
Breyer points out, that distinction "has generated a body of interpretive law
that is so complex that the law has become difficult to apply."3 29 Justice
Breyer pointed out that the confusion results from the extension of the doctrine
to include indirect-effect municipal liability for the acts of underlings. The
result is that "[f]actual and legal changes have divorced the law from the
distinction's apparent original purposes," 330 such that "later law has made the
distinction, not simply wrong, but obsolete and a potential source of
confusion." 331 Even Justice Breyer, however, stopped short of advocating
adoption of a generalized respondeat superior approach, though some
academic critics have done so. 332 Instead, he asserted only that "the case for
reexamination is a strong one."

333

The inadequacy of current doctrine does not mean that generalized
respondeat superior is the right solution. Among other objections, vicarious
liability does not even attempt to achieve accommodation. Its increased
burdens on governments may siphon resources from other, arguably more
socially productive uses, 334 and those costs may, in the long run, hinder the
growth of constitutional protections if judges worry that new guarantees may
cost too much in terms of payments for past injuries. 335 Also, the benefit of
the imposition of those increased costs may be small, as vicarious liability
may not deter any better than negligence. 336 As a practical matter, it is

328. Id.
329. Id. at 431.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 35, at 963 (first citing interview with Rosalie B. Levinson,
Professor, Valparaiso Univ. Law School; and then citing interview with David Rudovsky, Univ.
of Pa. School of Law); see also CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS, supra note 20, at 217 ("[Strict liability
under § 1983] is widely endorsed by academic commentators, many of whom favor strict
liability either of the officer defendant or the government employer."); cf Amar, supra note 35,
at 812-12 (focusing on police officers' liability for Fourth Amendment violations).
333. Brown, 520 U.S. at 437 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
334. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the

Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 412 (2000) ("Compensating
constitutional torts cannot be expected to bring society closer to any just distributive pattern and
will, in many cases, exacerbate the injustice of the existing distribution .... ").
335. See Jeffries, supra note 42, at 90.
336. See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 185, at 285 (noting that outcomes will likely be
similar and suggesting that "by singling out negligent supervisory officials and identifying the
measures that they should have taken, a negligence-based approach to vicarious liability might
be more effective than strict vicarious liability at motivating cost-effective monitoring, training,
and similar measures: negligence cases would generate a body of information about required
precautionary measures for the guidance of other municipalities").
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unrealistic to think that the Court as currently constituted, or that any
politically-attuned group of federal legislators, would expand municipal
liability to this furthest point.
A danger of polarized debates is that the very terms of the discussion
deflect attention from solutions that can satisfy some, if not all, of the interests
of both sides. Such is the case with § 1983 municipal liability. This Article
has identified a middle-ground approach between (1) the Court's largely
incoherent current case law 337 and (2) vicarious liability for all constitutional
torts committed by government employees in the course of their employment.
This alternative starts with the proposition, drawn from other § 1983 cases,
that the overall point of the doctrine is to accommodate competing interests.
Adoption of a municipal duty of reasonable care, under which cities would be
held liable for unreasonable policymaker failings in overseeing subordinates'
work, would serve the accommodation principle by vindicating constitutional
rights and deterring violations more effectively than current law, all without
incurring the heavy costs that would attend across-the-board adoption of the
respondeat superior approach.

337. See CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS, supra note 20, at 267-68.
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